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CULTURAL SPHERE AND PUBLIC INTEREST

Combining Free and Participatory Culture, Cultural Democracy and Critiques of Value Regimes to Rethink Policy, Artistic and Institutional Practices v1.1

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ABSTRACT

The thesis aims at a holistic and multidisciplinary redefinition of public interest in the cultural sphere, contextualised in the democratic and cosmopolitan era. The thesis reveals various problems and weaknesses of the cultural sphere by combining a wide variety of concepts and discourses such as critiques of: high and mass culture, aesthetics, monopolistic competition, hegemonic value and copyrights regimes. In other words the thesis merges the critiques of the oligopolistic actors, of the hegemonic copyright and value regimes of the cultural sphere. The argument is supported by case studies of two major French museums and of Joseph Beuys' practice. After review several critiques of the cultural sphere the research argues for tackling these issues in the spirit of cultural democracy, free culture and participatory culture. As our findings show these three notions can provide approaches to creating an 'ideal' cultural sphere.

After redefining public interest, we will suggest how all stakeholders may reach these 'ideal' conditions. The suggestions are addressed to public bodies – including cultural and educational institutions, policy makers, public funding bodies – and cultural professionals.

The thesis concludes, there is a clear need to open up a debate about cultural value in order to eliminate hegemonic value regimes. Recent copyright regimes, systems of public subsidy and cultural institutions do not serve the public interest. In order to possibly obtain a balanced, competitive and democratic cultural sphere, which promotes freedom of expression and cultural identity, active cultural participation is also indispensable. Finally the research explores the promise and possible ways of development of the online cultural sphere.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

I. INTRODUCTION

The aim of this research is to redefine public interest in the cultural sphere and to suggest changes to the way the latter operates. To accurately define public interest and to understand the problems involved in their complexity, it is necessary to connect different discourses about the problems of the cultural sphere, such as aesthetic, sociological and economical critiques and take up fields as diverse as cultural economics, artistic practice, legislation, public institutions and funding. The research questions the fitness for public purpose the hegemonic value regime of the cultural sphere. In order to redefine public interest it connects the discourses of free culture, cultural democracy and participatory culture.

Our perspective is based on the basic theories of democracy and freedom. We do not argue for or against any given value regime, taste or habitus. Instead, we argue for a more open, democratic and participatory cultural sphere, which allows each individual to form their own taste and cultural identity, and to evaluate and consume cultural goods. Nor do we argue on the behalf of a new kind of academic recognition; on the contrary I am for a democratic, free and diverse cultural sphere. This is not an argument for a new cultural canon, but for a framework in which individuals are able to freely create, 'remix' and share content, while collectively evaluating cultural goods. Individuals – if they are free from institutional and monopolistic governance – are able to make relevant choices, are able to form their own cultural identity. Most of them are able to make the right decisions, which might also form of collective notions of value. Finally it is not an argument for my own taste and habitus, instead we shall advocate freedom of cultural value recognition and creation.

In this introduction we shall set out the main research questions and offer definitions of the terms used. We shall describe the historical and global contexts of the argument, showing their relevance in the contemporary global framework. The next section of the thesis summarizes the different critiques and problems of the cultural sphere, based on a wide variety of arguments, supported by case studies. As a next step, we shall deploy different discourses – such as free culture, cultural democracy and participatory culture – in order to redefine the notion of public interest and an 'ideal' cultural sphere that serves this public interest. We shall then suggest changes needed in order to reach the ideal conditions of the cultural sphere, including value regimes, business models and issues of identity, legislation, artistic and institutional practice and infrastructure. Finally we shall explore the multifaceted promise of the online cultural sphere, which connects new media and culture.

1. Motivation

Being educated and deeply involved in the 'high cultural' scene, I have been led to question the relevance of my own and my colleagues' practice, especially if it has received public subsidy. Hence I have formulated the questions set out below. My undergraduate thesis analysed the impact of digital technology on the democratic and participatory tendencies in photography. This work has provided a preliminary case study for the present one. I hope that the answers this thesis will contribute to a new approach to definitions of value and various practices in the cultural field.

2. Research Questions

- What is the nature of culture? What makes something culturally valuable?

- What legitimizes high culture? Is this legitimacy definable and provable?

- How is cultural identity formed?

- What are the problems and weaknesses of the cultural sphere?

- What are creativity and quality in a cultural context? What do democracy, competition and freedom mean in a cultural context? What does public interest mean in a cultural setting? What would the ideal conditions of the cultural sphere look like?

- What needs to be done to realize such ideal conditions? How should cultural economics, artistic practice, legislation, public institutions and cultural subsidy be rethought? What would the cultural sphere look like if the ideal conditions could be realized?

- How do the Internet and digital technology support the realization of these conditions?

3. Research Methodology

The research is highly multidisciplinary, as both the problematics discussed and the discourses analysed embrace different fields, such as sociology, economics, aesthetics, cultural studies, communications, law, philosophy of politics and science. This piece of work is above all theoretical in nature and as such draws on a range of theories in different fields to make its case. To form a clearer argument, the research discuss upon several case studies.

4. Research Hypothesis

The hypothesis of the research is that there are different kinds of interest groups, such as high cultural, economic, political and legislative, which act as monopolies in the cultural sphere, each in a different way, but all against the public interest. The public

interest needs to be clarified. This framework in which it is defended by the public authorities only creates a new kind of 'monopoly'. This framework therefore needs to be rethought, e.g. the roles of value regimes and the possible regulation creators, public institutions and funding, market and infrastructure.

5. Terminology

The key terms used are defined below.

5.1. Culture

The term 'culture' has a wide variety of understandings. I use Williams' broadest understanding of culture. As an "independent noun, whether used generally or specifically, which indicates, a particular way of life" (90). As I shall argue, the two other understandings are tools of exclusion.

5.1.1. Cultural Sphere

I use the term 'cultural sphere' to mean the open cultural market, creating goods and services, where individuals are also active participants or actors. The cultural market is a profit-oriented sub-sphere of the cultural sphere.

5.1.1.1. Institution

The term 'institution' refers to a wide variety in formal actors in the cultural sphere, like policy makers, museums, cinemas, theatres, TV and radio stations. These can be non-profits, public or market oriented.

5.1.1.2. Cultural Industry

The term 'cultural industry' refers to the profit-oriented approach to and model of cultural creation, in which actors have oligopolistic power and the content is mass-produced and distributed worldwide.

5.1.1.3. Commercial and non-commercial Culture

Commercial culture is "that part of our culture that is produced and sold or produced to be sold" as defined by Lessig (2004: 7). Non-commercial culture is all other forms of culture. Together, they constitute the hybrid economy (Lessig, 2008).

5.1.2. Elite Culture

'Elite culture' refers to a form of culture, recognized by a specific value regime, be understood as "artistic activity" (Williams, 90), including opera, ballet, poetry, literature, painting, sculpture, music and drama. Elite culture is usually based on formal education and uses a continuously changing but strict value regime. As such, it is exclusive by nature, as all individuals do not enjoy the same kinds of formal education and habitus. Elite culture is used by its proponents as a tool to distinguish themselves from other groups in society; it erects a high barrier to entry; it can be internally competitive and its goods are in a sense market-oriented. Elite culture also has a 'remix' nature as it picks up content from the other cultural spheres, but these other subcultural spheres cannot directly influence it. The market of elite culture requires uniqueness. By definition its content needs to be authentic and original. Anything outside this pre-Enlightenment elite cultural sphere can be described as 'folk culture' or 'popular culture'.

5.1.2.1. High Culture

The difference between elite and 'high culture' can be understood in the mirror of eighteenth century Enlightened Absolutism. The previously strictly separate elite culture – as a result of different political changes – started to become accessible to the wider society. The elite begins to establish public institutions to make its own culture accessible. The promoters of high culture use public institutions and education in order to propagate their own value. High culture has a strictly top down nature and the word

'high' refers to a mysterious hierarchy of value regimes and forms of culture. It supplants all the other forms of culture; anything outside this high sphere can be described as 'subculture'.

5.1.2.2. Art

The term art is usually used for cultural content that has been evaluated according to the regime of elite and high culture.

5.1.2.3. Artists vs. Amateur

Making the distinction between creators by calling them 'artists' and 'amateurs' is a tool for elite and high culture to legitimate their hegemony, in which act functions as a tool of exclusion. There are false understandings of the creator, which describe the talent of creation as an inborn ability, making the content independent from its evaluation and allowing the creator to work autonomously and with uncontested authority.

5.1.2.3.1. Cultural Democratization

According to Gordon by 'cultural democratization' I refer to the – mostly physical – open 'access' to high culture in a top-down way, realized by different public cultural and educational institutions.

5.1.3. Folk Culture

'Folk culture' can be understood as an open, participatory and bottom-up form of creativity. The elements of folk culture are shared and can be 'remixed'. According to Lessig this is the read and write nature of culture (2007). Folk culture and its value regime are not based on formal education. In this case, evaluation of the cultural goods depends on the community. As the barrier of entry is low, everyone has the possibility to

act as a creator and the value of the creator and their creation can be recognized in an open debate. This makes the market of folk culture highly competitive and diverse, as well as hybrid.

5.1.4. Mass / Popular Culture

The terms 'mass culture' and 'popular culture' refer to the content and consumption of the cultural industry respectively. Both are highly dependent on mass media. The content is market oriented, mass produced and distributed. The competition in this market is oligopolistic as the barrier of entry is high. This sphere is not participative, but consumption is portrayed as participation that is top down in nature. It is globally uniform and occupies a hegemonic position in the new media. Content is evaluated in the light of oligopolistic market conditions.

The main misunderstanding of mass or popular culture is that mass consumption is representative of the taste of the masses. Because it is an oligopolistic market, however, it cannot reflect the real needs, interests and taste of consumers.

5.1.5. Participatory Culture

By the term 'participatory culture' I mean publicly created and recognized culture, which is also open, bottom-up and has a 'remix' nature.

5.1.6. Cultural Democracy

'Cultural democracy' can be defined as a state of culture in which the capacity to create is open to everyone (Gordon), value is recognized by a public debate that is bottom-up in nature.

5.1.7. Free Culture

'Free culture' is a notion linked to arguments for the redefinition of the recently

hegemonic copyright regime, which eliminates the participatory and 'remix' nature of culture.

5.1.8. Cultural Translation

As Trivedi cites Bhabha, the postmodernist idea of cultural translation is a non-textual non-linguistic performative act of cultural communication. The term can also be understood as the act of building bridge between different cultural value regimes and systems of habitus.

5.2. Value Recognition

This refers to the formation of the canon, to the evaluation of content and to demarcation of value and non-value.

5.2.1. Academic

This term pertains to value recognition by a fixed methodology, strict rules and institutional power.

5.2.2. Aesthetics

Under the term 'aesthetics' I mean the evaluation regime of cultural goods, based on an elitist, but not necessarily academic argument.

5.2.3. Remix

The term 'remix' in a cultural context means that no content can be totally authentic and original as all creation refers to and uses previous works. In some settings the term relational is used. Remix cannot be separated from the very nature of culture. As Knell quotes Lessig, "[i]f art could be […] free to remix and re-express and recreate then art would be different [...], it would be the expressions of creativity that we are increasingly

seeing" (2006: 9). Remix requires sharing and copying content.

5.3. Democracy

By 'democracy' in its political sense I mean the equal right and power to access and participate in decision making. Democracy – usually through elections – is a system, that enables the citizens to make decisions or to delegate some responsibilities to the formal and communal body of the state. In order to eliminate the tyranny of the majority and keep the political palette diverse, the state needs to balance the representation of all opinions, minorities and values. The state also uphold the diversity of public opinions without creating any hierarchy of values, any hegemonic discourses. Despite the critiques of it, democracy is the hegemonic system in the industrially developed world and is widely accepted as possibly the most stable and balanced political system.

5.3.1. Representative and Direct Democracy

There are two main sorts of democracy. In a 'representative' democracy those who have the right to do so elect someone to act and to make decisions on their behalf. In a 'direct' democracy the decision making process is directly accessible, so decisions are based on the personal decisions of individuals. In general, direct democracy allows more public control.

5.3.2. Public Interest

'Public interest' refers to the shared aims and values of a community.

5.3.3. Access vs. Participation

The term 'access' is used the to define the possibility of physical, economical and intellectual connection to something, e.g. a cultural content. This describes a passive, one way, top-down model, as the content is determined. As an opposite of access, the

term 'participation' can be understood as the capacity to play active role, which means a bottom-up model of creation, where everyone may act as a creator.

5.4. Perfect Competition

We understand 'perfect competition' in the economics sense of a market. Perfectly competitive market consists infinite number of buyers and sellers, zero entry and exit barriers, zero transaction costs, perfect factor of production mobility and information, profit maximization and homogeneous products (Mas-Colell). This idealistic market model can be considered an unreachable aim, serving public interest as consumers are able to maximize their profit in a diverse market.

In the case of the cultural market there is an important difference, as not all the actors maximize profit. The cultural market is a hybrid of market oriented and not for profit approaches.

6. Context

This section is dedicated to the European historical and global contemporary context of the cultural sphere, and seeks to provide a better understanding of its recent conditions, problems and weaknesses.

6.1. European Historical Perspective

6.1.1. Before the Enlightenment: Elite and Folk Culture

In the European context the pre-Enlightenment cultural sphere had three main players: elite culture, folk culture and religion. At the time elite and folk culture were usually strictly separated. Religion played a central role and was the common platform for elite and folk culture. It is crucial to note that religion in itself – similarly to elite culture – had an exclusive, top down nature.

With the advent of print production began a shift from elite and religious culture towards popular culture, offering more freedom. As Eisenstein states, the "individual access to diverse texts is a different matter than bringing many minds to bear on a single text" (11).

6.1.2. Enlightenment Absolutism: Democratization of High Culture

The Enlightenment completely changed the cultural palette, especially as a result of absolutist hence top down political approach. The importance of religion started to decline. The elite started to make elite culture accessible via public institutions. This was in fact designed to replace folk culture with elite culture under the umbrella of public education and museums. On one hand it was an important step towards sharing elite culture with the masses. On the other hand the over-representation of elite culture and the non-recognition of folk culture curtailed the diversity of the cultural sphere. This is what can be called cultural democratization. Gradually the discourse changes as elite culture becomes high culture: the elite proves its own culture's universal value and over-represents itself via public institutions. Correspondingly the importance of folk culture and its participatory nature ever has recognized. The resulting dominance of high culture was problematic as this shift was funded from the public budget, advocated in the name of the public. Mass culture at the same time meant a wide variety of print sources with increasing influence on cultural consumption.

6.1.3. Mass Media and Modernity

The electronic media completely changed the power structures of the cultural sphere as these new technologies made fundamentally new ways of production and distribution possible. These in turn favoured the emergence of oligopolies in the cultural sphere.

From this point on the cultural market was dominated by the duality of high culture and mass culture. The representatives and institutions of high culture began to look upon mass culture as a dangerous enemy. By using public institutions and subsidy the elite attempted to balance to mass culture with other forms of culture more original to itself.

This reaction of the elite revealed two main problems. First, the actual market was oligopolistic and furthermore mass culture was not representative of the taste of the masses. The elite started to fight against the tastes, systems of habitus and consumption of the masses instead of making the market more competitive. Second, the elite used high culture as the counterpoint of mass culture, but because of its exclusive nature, it was not able to exercise this crucial role.

This problematic is discussed in depths in the second sections, but this requires a historical overview before going into the details and to clarify clear the conditions prevailing before the appearance of participatory media.

6.2. Late Modern and Cosmopolitan Democracy

Recent global tendencies such as the general conditions of late modernity (Giddens) are deeply influencing the cultural sphere. As Giddens argues, choice has become a fundamental element in the formation of the self (80-81). As the author points out,

> a multiplicity of choices is not to suppose that all choices are open to everyone, or that people take all decisions about options in full realization of the range of feasible alternatives [and … t]he plurality of choices which confronts individuals in situations of high modernity derives from several influences (82).

As he later concludes, "[i]ndividuals will be free to make informed choices about their activities" (214). Individuals need the possibility of choices in order to freely form their cultural identity. Late modernity in general provides more and more chance to do so.

In an anthropological perspective, Arjun Appadurai argues that cultural transaction

with the other is more and more intensive (1996: 26) because a

> worldwide order of institutions has emerged that bears witness
> to what we may call "grassroots globalization," or "globalization
> from below (16).

He argues that non-governmental organizations – in a bottom-up way – are the most important advocates of equity, access, justice, and redistribution, both at global and local level (15). Hence we cannot think exclusively about national and local cultural spheres, markets or actors anymore.

The concept of cosmopolitan democracy as defined by Beck and Archibugi advocates a democratic world free from nationalistic discourses that is able to better accommodate the cosmopolitan and global framework of culture. As Beck argues,

> the 'cosmopolitanization thesis' is a methodological concept
> which helps to overcome methodological nationalism and to
> build a frame of reference to analyze the new social conflicts,
> dynamics and structures (2002: 18).

In Beck's understanding the global world is established on the dualism of national and international and consequently the notion of nation is in a crisis of legitimacy (19). According to Beck the cosmopolitan concept includes the interaction of global and local, described by Robert Robertson as 'glocal'. About cosmopolitanization, Beck points out that the

> national has to be rediscovered as the internalized global (23)
> [… and people] are reflecting on a shared collective future,
> which contradicts a nation-based memory of the past" and
> memory of past is national, but the imagination of future is
> cosmopolitan (27).

Beck argues that culture has become geography-independent and that Bourdieu's concepts have relevance in an international context (34). Referring to Immanuel Kant and Karl Popper, Beck argues that universal cosmopolitanism is an idealized situation (35). In Beck's understanding "nationalism has taken shape as the remaining real danger

to the culture of political freedom" (38). He evokes

> economic freedom, that is the liberalization of markets, and
> political freedom, that is forms of democratic self-determination
> and the cultural acknowledgement of the otherness of others
> (39).

This definition can be understood as the essence of culture in the cosmopolitan context. In Beck's opinion, the Internet is the central tool to push individuals towards world citizenship, as "free market ideology undermines democratic politics and democratic identities" (39). As Beck later argues,

> we must unite to create an effective cosmopolitan world politics.
> There is a new dialectic of global and local questions, which do
> not fit in to national (41) and "culture in the national outlook is
> understood in terms of self-enclosed territorially demarcated
> units […]. [This] frees us from the labour of dialogue, leading
> almost inevitably to imperialism, cultural conflict and the clash
> of civilizations (2006: 30).

Archibugi has a somewhat different point of view on the same issues but proposes a very similar cosmopolitan solution: "[t]he cosmopolitan democracy project points to a way out of the present uncertainty: the democratization of the international system as a political course parallel to the domestic democratization of states" (1998: 223). Archibugi describes the problematic aims of states as they "strengthen themselves internally through the creation of a unified cultural identity" (200: 138). The author argues that national institutions need to be open to the notion of diversity and additionally access should not eliminate the development of cosmopolitan democracy (142). As Archibugi argues most recently, the two areas of intervention need to be the acceptance of cultural diversity and strengthening of the selfdetermination of peoples (2008: 88). As he points out,

> [e]ach community can embrace self-government and [...] is able
> to freely choose the forms of political participation that best suit
> the community's cultural and social traditions. This means

> [that ...] democracy is a regime that must be constructed bottom-
> up and not top-down (278).

These views appear to best describe in a nutshell the most progressive approaches and understandings of the cosmopolitan cultural order of late modernity and they both frame and support the arguments of this thesis.

II. DEFINING THE PROBLEMS

This section is a literature review, dedicated to providing a holistic understanding of the different problems and weaknesses of the cultural sphere by drawing on a wide variety of discourses from the fields of aesthetics, cultural sociology, law and economics. These are the basis for the argument and are a reference point for the case studies, as well as transformations that will be advocated.

1. Hegemonic Value Regime and Discourse

These is considerable evidence to show that the high culture originated value regime acts as an 'monopoly' and represents itself as universal value. This research discuss upon both aesthetic and sociological arguments about cultural value and taste that inform the issue. Through two case studies, it will explore problems of institutional formation and representation of value and identity.

1.1. Aesthetic Values of High Culture, the Adorno Case

Theodor W. Adorno – a key figure of post-war European cultural theory and aesthetics – interpreted the post-war aesthetic value regime as a high cultural critique of the emerging mass, popular culture. He argued that the role of mass media in taste formation, eliminates "the right to a freedom of choice which empirically, in any case, no one any longer exercises" (30) and observed that:

> [w]hat makes its appearance aesthetically in the pleasure categories can no longer give pleasure, and the promise of happiness, once the definition of art, can no longer be found except where the mask has been torn from the countenance of false happiness (33).

This quote shows how the author demarcates high culture from popular culture on the

basis of the aesthetic tradition. Moreover, it devaluates mass consumed culture in general. In his notion the mass media have attacked high culture. In his understanding, 'banal' culture has attacked the values that originate in the bourgeois (34). As he saw the relationship of art and society,

> [t]he more inexorably the principle of exchange value destroys use values for human beings, the more deeply does exchange value disguise itself as the object of enjoyment [and i]f the value of taste in the present situation is questioned, it is necessary to understand what taste is composed of in this situation. Acquiescence is rationalized as modesty, opposition to caprice and anarchy (39-40).

In Adorno's understanding, aesthetically valued high culture is more than enjoyment, more than ecstasy without content (52). By these statements he makes a clear demarcation of 'value' and 'not value' in an exclusivist way. He also states that the consumption of culture "was from time immemorial confined to a narrow group" (47). On the other hand in his opinion the way, in which the masses receive culture is "childish" and "retarded". As another criticism of the mass cultural market he asserts that "the so-called liberals and progressives whom one finds among the advocates of light popular music, most of whom want to classify their activity as democratic" (55). This means that popular culture is aesthetically not valuable; low culture is not the democracy of choice as – in Adorno's opinion – it is not an alternative. Indeed, the masses are not able to recognize value because

> if works of art have only intermittently been perceived as such, then mass art has taken that alienation of the masses from art, blindly sustained in life by society, up into the process of production as its presupposition, lives from it and deliberately reproduces it (64).

The author then states that the attacks upon modern art made by tax-payers is "an illusory democracy [… w]hile the total social constitution formally guarantees equal

rights, it nonetheless continues to conserve the educational privilege", which only allows a few in society to experience art (128). This means that in his understanding the value is universal, only its recognition depends on the educational background of the individual. Universality, value and democracy have an antagonistic relationship here. Adorno further argues that

> the standards of the culture industry are the ossified standards of what was formerly entertainment and low art, has the tendency to believe (sic) that the culture industry totally and (sic) utterly dominates and controls both the conscious and the unconscious of those people at whom it is directed – the same people out of whose taste during the liberal era the culture industry grew [… as] the culture industry was perfectly adapted to its consumers (195).

He criticizes the cultural industry because it serves the masses with low quality culture, which distances people from art (64), but this itself is exclusionary. This argument is similar to Benjamin's in the 'The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction', where he argues forauthenticity and originality.

On the other hand Adorno argues that

> [a]esthetic truth was bound to the expression of the untruth of bourgeois society. [...A]rt itself has become utterly questionable. Monopoly is the executor: eliminating tension, it abolishes art along with conflict (76).

Indeed, as Benkler points out, in Benjamin's work as well

> aura of unique works of art as reinforcing a distance between the masses and the representations of culture [… and t]he barrier of production costs, production values, and the star system that came along with them, replaced the iconic role of the unique work of art with new, but equally high barriers to participation in making culture (2006: 296).

As O'Connor observes, Adorno positioned himself

> against the market in order to secure culture from the miasma of commerciality. This was not simply a case of what we now call 'market failure', where the State steps in to do what the market

cannot (14).

This is however a more general and basic critique of enjoyment and of the choice, of free individuals. Miege also points out that Adorno's

> concept of the Culture Industry failed to register the distinctions between the different kinds of cultural commodities that were derived from the mechanism whereby exchange value was collected (20).

Thus Adorno argued not only against mass culture, but also against the taste of the 'masses', in other words against any non-elitist systems of habitus and value regime. This argument for high culture has a clearly exclusionary nature and indeed can be seen as a statement against diversity. In short, Adorno stood against all sorts of non high cultural habitus and value regimes. As such – based on an aesthetic judgement – this argument devaluates anything which is outside of a specific value regime. Adorno may well be right in his critique of the impacts and outcomes of the cultural industry, but these weaknesses originate from the hegemonic nature of mass culture instead of the value regimes of its consumers. This argument is a major misunderstanding of an oligopolistic market, of democracy and of the individuals' ability to form their own taste.

1.2. Sociological Role of Aesthetic Value, the Bourdieu Case

As argued with reference to Adorno, the traditional aesthetic understanding of value demarcation represented as universal has an exclusionary nature, which condemns the taste and the value recognition ability of ordinary people and as such can not serve public interest. The aesthetic cultural goods in question are not widely accessible, nor is their creation and recognition participative. In the following section we shall apply Bourdieu's sociological critiques of aesthetics to demonstrate the false notion that any value regime can be universal.

As Bourdieu claims in relation to the perception of cultural goods:

> the conditions that make it possible to experience [...] cultural objects as at once endowed with meaning is totally excluded from the experience itself, because the recapturing of the work's objective meaning [...] is completely adequate and immediately effected (216).

Regarding the role of education – as a crucial point in the formation of the habitus – Bourdieu's argument is that the process of coding a cultural content are determined by the education of the individual and that moreover

> [t]he degree of artistic competence depends not only on the degree to which the available system of classification is mastered, but also on the degree of complexity or subtlety of this system of classification, and it is therefore measurable by the ability to operate a fairly large number of successive divisions in the universe of representations and thus to determine rather fine classes (222). [...Also] the readability of a work of art for a particular individual varies according to the divergence between the more or less complex and subtle code required by the work, and the competence of the individual (224).

As the decoding of cultural content is dependent on the individual's habitus and cultural capital, "only a few have the real possibility of benefiting from the theoretical possibility, generously offered to all, of taking advantage of the works exhibited in museums" (234). Thus the value regime of high culture cannot be universal as the recognition of something as value is socially determined. Moreover, if high culture cannot be universal, then all forms of culture might be equally valuable and recognition depends on the social determination of individuals. This also indicates the parallel existence of multiple value regimes. John Paul similarly points out that,

> art is a social institution in that it passes on cultural information, values and normative standards of behavior. [… It] may be examined as a socializing agent and a motivating force [… and] may be conceptualized as an ideology of domination and/or a cultural mechanism of social change (10-11).

A key connection between democracy, participation and culture is made by Fuchs, when

he comments on Bourdieu that the latter

> has pointed out that the re-creation process of modern society is one that is based on exclusion, class separation and domination. His analysis concludes that class societies do not guarantee full democratic participation and that democracy is today especially threatened by the neo-liberal ideology that expands the distance between dominating and dominated class (sectors) (406).

Similar Kidd argues, that

> [a]esthetic narratives are social constructions maintained by social practice (2009: 300) [and] many social-scientific studies have also emphasized the role of art as a tool for social exclusion (301). [S]tatus [is acquired] by gaining access to, experience with, and knowledge of goods typically used for exclusion. The knowledge and the experience they gain — their cultural capital, to use Bourdieu's term — then legitimize their continued participation in highstatus groups (301).

This author also argues that economic elites construct their status by creating high

cultural organizations and this is what they emphasize as canonical: "art functions not as

a status good, but as a mechanism for identity politics [and a]rt becomes more inclusive

as the same works of art and interpretive frameworks become available to all" (304).

This overlaps with Bourdieu's concept about the relation of art and habitus. Kidd point

out that art could become more inclusive, if the there is an accessible interpretive

framework.

Clearly then the way, in which culture is evaluated is highly dependent on social

status and cultural capital. We have also noted earlier how the elite deploys the

discourses of universality, authenticity and originality in order to use culture as a tool of

social exclusion and empowerment. Moreover the discourses support the marketability

of material culture instead of representing value. Together the arguments cited above

indicates the need for the institution of culture to be represented in a democratic and

participatory way. The cultural sphere needs to be balanced, otherwise there will always be over- and under-represented value regime that are considerable high and infenior or 'sub-cultural'.

1.3. A Progressive Approach in the Discourse of High Culture

Pascal Gielen has bridged Bourdieu's concept of habitus and Bourriaud's concept of 'relational aesthetic'. Referring to Bourdieu, Gielen argues that

> art as aristocratic heritage came face to face with a sociological ideal of [the 'democratic paradigm'] (792), [while e]mpirical research showed that artistic values […] cannot be juxtaposed to more sociological considerations such as community mechanisms and the influence of an institutional context. [… S]ome value systems are more dominant for particular artistic sectors or generations [… but] social actors can 'play' with different value regimes depending on the situation, time or social setting (805).

This statement shows how deeply value depends on the setting. Nicolas Bourriaud's concept of relational aesthetic covers

> a set of artistic practices which take as their theoretical and practical point of departure the whole of human relations and their social context, rather than an independent and private space (113). […] There is nothing more absurd either than the assertion that contemporary art does not involve any political project [… t]he possibility of *relational* art [… is to point] a radical upheaval of the aesthetics, cultural and political goals introduced by modern art (14).

As Bourriaud argues, all cultural content relates to the socio-political context and functions as reflection. By relational aesthetics he refers to the social reflexivity and processes of art (33). Relational aesthetics looks at art as a tool of community building, advocating a better future. This concept is important for our argument because it is part of a critique formulated an influential thinker of the contemporary high cultural sphere. Moreover, conceptualizing creation as reflection renders it more supportive of access. Downey's argument about relational aesthetics assumes that

> Bourriaud's broad use of terms such as conviviality, democracy, dialogue and politics [...] all needs further consideration and qualification if a politics of relational aesthetics is to have purchase in a neoliberal, globalised and service-based economic milieu. [… A]esthetics [...] is being ever more called upon to provide both insight into politics itself and the stimuli for social change. […] In further considering these notions we can [...] advance an ideational framework within which to discuss a politics of contemporary aesthetics and the reception of relational art practices (275).

This progressive political terminology has clear connections with the sociological critiques of high culture, because as Bishop puts it, the concept of relational aesthetics is "locating contemporary practice within the culture at large: relational art is seen as a direct response to the shift from a goods to a service-based economy" (78). Bishop extends this critical view towards mass culture, connecting Fluxus, Happening and Joseph Beuys to relational aesthetics, because "[e]ach was accompanied by a rhetoric of democracy and emancipation that is very similar to Bourriaud's defense of" the concept (61-62). Regarding the long tradition of viewer participation in the work of art, she also points out that "[i]t is no longer enough to say that activating the viewer tout court is a democratic act, for every art work-even the most "open-ended" - determines in advance the depth of participation that the viewer may have with it (78). Bishop's argument overlaps with Anna Dezeuze's understanding, who claims in relation to Fluxus, that "everyday practices which Bourriaud celebrates remain general, as he refuses to address the ways in which they participate, or resist, a dominant social order" (150). Bishop naturally highlights fields of art, such as "socially-engaged art, community-based art, experimental communities, dialogic art, littoral art, participatory, interventionist, research-based, or collaborative art" (2). In her opinion the most problematic issue is the

> tendency to view the aesthetic as (at best) merely visual and (at worst) an elitist realm of unbridled seduction entirely complicit with spectacle [… By referring to Jacques Rancière she argues,

that] 'the aesthetic regime of art' — is predicated on a tension and confusion between autonomy (the desire for art to be at one remove from means-ends relationships) and heteronomy (the blurring of art and life) (9).

She continues that 'good art' according to Rancière "is necessarily political in its redistribution of sensible forms that have a dissensual relationship to the autonomous world of art and the everyday world we inhabit" (10-11). This approach pushes art towards life. It is crucial to see how Bishop contrasts autonomous art with socially engaged, participatory and reflective art and concludes that "Rancière's argument is that the status quo is preserved by never confronting 'the aesthetic thing' directly" (16). Similarly, Toni Ross writes, that "[a] prominent feature of relational aesthetics is its cancellation of the avant-gardist value of dissent. Bourriaud contends that contemporary artists no longer seek to negate the status quo from a position outside the dominant culture" (170). Ross also points out that the democratic aspect of relational aesthetics is the equality of producer and consumer; his position on relational aesthetics reinforces our argument that "artists and members of the public, or art and a plurality of disciplinary parts, come together on an equal footing to form a whole. More specifically, relational aesthetics echoes the central values of liberal consensus politics" (171). Another relevant noiton is Robert Hariman's which applies to "those forms of expression and norms of artistic judgement that are characteristic of a democratic society and that provide a sense of cultural continuity across otherwise distinct social practices and beliefs" (289). In Hariman's understanding it would be "considerable loss if we ignore the 'natural' forms of expressiveness" (292). With this statement the author goes even further and connects democratic and participatory culture with the very nature of free expression.

In the light of the arguments presented above regarding relational aesthetics, we can

see a clear shift in the critiques and understandings of high culture. Moreover, relational aesthetics is a recognition of the remix nature of high culture. As such, it needs directly connect to the arguments for originality, authenticity and the 'sacred', usually used in order to recognize the 'value' of art. In general, relational aesthetics can be understood as a recognition of the undemocratic nature of high culture.

1.4. "Whose art is it anyway?"

Although art is usually recognized as a universal value, the ideas we have discussed call this universal status into question. Hence the need to rethink the role of art in our societies. In O'Connor's understanding

> Adorno's Culture Industry was thus not primarily about the commodification of culture; it was about the organisation of cultural commodity production on a mass industrial scale. As such the complex play between art as commodity and as autonomous form collapsed as the independent artist gave way to the culture factory (12).

This is a crucial point in order to identify the main misunderstanding in critiques of mass media. O'Connor claims that autonomous modern art originates from Alexander Baumgarten and Immanuel Kant as

> "they attempted to ground judgements of 'taste' [...] on a general theory of perception in which 'the beautiful' became a central, objective category. [... B]eautiful rested not therefore on individual taste but on an objective viewpoint [...]. Aesthetics concerned precisely these universal, 'disinterested' judgements of taste and beauty (12-13).

This understanding of value has a highly exclusive nature as it empowers those few who are able to recognize 'objective' value. Bourdieu's research proved there is no 'objective' viewpoint, as the personal value regime is deeply dependent on the individual's habitus.

As Holden argues, <"democratic agenda" is an acknowledgement of the right to art, and a bold commitment to the quality as well as the quantity of experiences of art that

should be available to all> (2004: 12). Holden's critiques of high culture showed that fundamental changes need to be made to provide complete access. He also suggests new paradigms of a cultural value regime, including the recognition of "the affective elements of cultural experience, practice and identity", "broad public value", "broad and unchanging concepts of public goods" (2004: 59-60), although according to Bourdieu, this might be impossible as the individuals understanding is determined by the person's cultural capital. Holden claims that

> the true value of the right to art will only be realised when it is calculated on a broader measure than that of narrow instrumentality, or profit and loss (13) [...and] the right to art will produce a more vibrant visual [or other forms of] culture, [...] and ensure a genuinely creative future (14).

Cherbo and Vogel argue that changes in cultural value recognition "is a shifting phenomenon and that no absolute, inherent value can be placed on a work of art, as it is subject to the values, taste, and conditions of its time and place" (Isar 2009: 34).

At this point the authors refer to the 'crisis of value in cultural theory'. In their understanding "curators and institutions have to respond to the contemporary global vastness. The challenge is to be able to stay up-to-date" (55). As O'Connor refers to Garnham, "art and the market are not inimical to each other [… and p]ublic policy can and should use the market as a way to distribute cultural goods and services" (23). Garnham wants to achieve this by audience research, increased access and "to break out of a cultural policy centred on the 'arts'" (24).

According to Knell, access can be increased by the personalisation of art. The author argues that, in order to 'personalize' art, there is a clear need for "responsive, customer focused organisations [… to] pose an innovation and public engagement challenge for the arts" (7). This means a deeper cooperation and relation between creators, advocates

and the public instead of a formal and highly autonomous creation, top-down distribution. Knell quotes Lessig, "[i]f art could be […] free to remix and re-express and recreate then art would be different [...], it would be the expressions of creativity that we are increasingly seeing" (9). In Lessig's opinion remix is a form of participation and internalization. Knell claims that arts organizations need to personalize, understand their potential audience, which "will directly shape the way in which artistic products are developed, produced and brought to market" (10). As the author points out,

> [i]n an increasingly democratic and demanding age, artists have to establish the value of what they do through a conversation with their audiences, peers and stakeholders [… and value should be] tested and negotiated between producer and consumer (11).

This sense of connection between the creator and the viewer or receiver equalizes the relationship instead of the common one-way communication. In Knell's opinion "arts organisations need to completely rethink how they engage and inspire the public, rearticulated in their missions and models of delivery (13) [… and needs to should care] about delivery and access channels rather than the work or artists themselves" (15). This in turn requires online or face to face, direct communication with the audience. As Knell refers to David Lammy, there is a clear need for "a new engagement and interaction between providers [...] and audiences that counter the notion that our cultural institutions 'know best'" (17). This assertion can be understood as the essence of the notion of participatory culture. Knell stresses the importance of "artists and producers drawing upon open source principles to emphasise that personalisation" (21). Open source software provides a transparent and participatory environment in order to collectively develop software solutions and participatory culture can be described using the same concept. Moreover, new concepts of art creation are needed to blur "the line

between user and producer", to combine creativity and consumption (21). In regard to possible cooperative approaches Knell points out, that for quality reasons "not all art forms lend themselves to co-production", but at least the audience should evaluate the work (28). As he asserts,

> it is surely part of the mission of arts organisations to balance artistic excellence and integrity with audience focus and engagement, and that [...] the public weighs too little on arts organisations and artists in receipt of public money (30).

The influence to public subsidy has the effect of fundamentally re-frames the argument. Knell's answer is that value recognition by the public "is about prioritising public engagement and participation; creating more porous, open, dialogue based arts organisations; minimum levels of customer centricity" (32). He concludes this presentation of what could be called the public discourse of culture. With the following assertion

> public value [… should] reshape the pattern of funding and investment in the arts [… and p]ersonalisation is about making arts organisations more responsive to the public, but also about reinvigorating the process by which art is produced and commissioned. [… P]ublicly funded arts [...] genuinely connect with and engage the public, and make themselves more accountable and responsive to public preferences (39).

This conclusion underscores the necessity of allowing citizens access to the decision-making processes about public cultural funding. Supplementing this cohesion, Knüsel observes that:

> [t]he system of funding, established under signs of a democratization of culture, has once again developed into an ivory tower [… and s]tate funding of culture has not made art more popular. [… L]arge museums and theatres once funded to make them resistant to the market, now behave like the most commercial of event managers (Voesgen 2005: 90).

This point is basic to understanding the hegemonic nature of high culture. Holden' point

is also relevant, namely that "[p]ublic approval of culture is hidden; politicians are scared off culture by the media; and cultural professionals have spent too much time in a closed conversation" (2006b: 12-13).

In summary, there is a clear need to redefine value in relation to the needs and interests of the public rather than in accordance with hegemonic value regimes, if diversity and the freedom of identity formation are to be promoted. This recognition needs to be implemented in public institutional and funding guidelines. Certain artists and advocacy organizations would also need to rethink their practice accordingly.

1.4.1. The Unsuccessful Avant-Garde Movements

Line with the ideas set out already; it is possible to articulate that the progressive and revolutionary neo avant-garde art movements – all highly critical of aesthetic value judgements – have not fulfilled to realize their promises. These movements were deeply framed by the emerging mass media consumption and usually were critical of it.

Discussing Duchamp, Germer has argued that the concept of autonomic are

> had demonstrated the degree to which the concept of the aesthetic autonomy was dependent upon the institutional mechanisms of introduced systems into the museum space that challenged exclusion (65).

This autonomy shows freedom, not just from the institutional system and from the hegemonic value regime but also from society. According to Kuspit,

> [t]he artist's sense of his audience informs every aspect of his art, from its material medium to its aesthetic manner. [… T]he avant-garde artist [...] revolts against it like an adolescent against his family; [...] implicitly and often explicitly critical of his audience, tends to be innovative in medium as well as in manner, or else stretches a known medium and manner to their breaking point (84).

This is an important summary of the role of neo avant-garde in the development of

cultural democracy. As O'Connor also argues, "modernism began its great aesthetic renunciations, its retreat into difficult and occult formal procedures" (9). Huyssen argues for his part informs us, that the avant-garde art movements can be understood as critiques of the cultural institutions (18) and that

> the avant-garde's project to cross the boundaries between art and life has actually helped to bring down the walls of the museum, to democratize the institution, at least in terms of accessibility, and to facilitate the recent transformation of the museum from fortress for the select few to mass medium (20).

It is important to underline that this accessibility could be physical and economic but obviously not intellectual. Blurring art and life means more than the artistic representation of the life of a few, which has nothing to do with open participation and the destruction of hegemonic value regimes.

1.4.1.1. Joseph Beuys

An analysis of the manifestos and practice of Jospeh Beuys is useful in demonstrating why progressive and anti-elitist neo avant-garde approaches cannot provide a solution to the problems discussed above, even if they recognize them. Beuys argued for the freedom of creativity and for direct democracy, but his practice and self-understanding eliminated the public entirely.

In the 'Untitled Statement' (1973) he develops his main political critiques and solutions of the German and global society. He discusses the weaknesses of the existing economical, political and social systems, mostly distinguishing between 'Western' capitalism and 'Eastern' socialism; and goes on to propose his own solutions to these problems. His concept of the 'social sculpture' is a new social, political and economical system. He argues that "sculpting can be extended to the invisible materials used by everyone: […] how we mould and shape the world in which we live: Sculpture as an

evolutionary process; everyone an artist" (Stiles, 633-4). This concept views society as a sculpture, formed by each member of the society. Beuys supports the idea of "a free, democratic solution which places us in solidarity" with responsibility for our fellow-men, nature and future (637). He calls this the alternative 'THIRD WAY' and 'SOCIAL SCULPTURE'. As he points out, this new social structure could be achieved by free development, by solidarity and equality of economical, social, cultural rights and duties. As Beuys argues, "what is wished for is: MUTUAL HELP GIVEN BY FREE CHOICE" (638). In his opinion in the new economic and monetary order "everyone is going to find his place in the life of society, where he is able to use his capacities freely, productively, and meaningfully for the benefit of the whole" in the environment of free science, free education, and free information (641). As a solution on an individualist basis he argues for "personal responsibility and self-government (decentralization)" (641). According to Beuys these rights should be globally given and the "state is going to shrink considerably". "Anyone who envisages this picture of the evolutionary alternative has a clear understanding of the SOCIAL SCULPTURE which MAN AS AN ARTIST is helping to build" (642). Beuys looked forward to a global, participative dialogue of people to form society, to develop alternative solutions. According to Beuys the new politics should be based on the 'JOINT ELECTION CAMPAIGN' (643). This political system eliminates any kind of party based, centralized and organized political activity, but supports the plurality and the autonomous individuals (644). In 1973 in the 'Not Just a Few Are Called, But Everyone' interview Beuys pointed out that

> the future social order will take its shape from compatibility with the theoretical principles of art [… and e]veryone will be a necessary co-creator of a social architecture, and, so long as anyone cannot participate, the ideal form of democracy has not been reached (Beuys in Harrison 890-1).

In 1974 he described this concept in detail, arguing that

> [o]nly art is capable of dismantling the repressive effects of a
> senile social system that continues to totter along the deathline:
> to dismantle in order to build A SOCIAL ORGANISM AS A
> WORK OF ART. […] EVERY HUMAN BEING IS AN
> ARTIST who - from his state of freedom - the position of
> freedom that he experiences at first-hand learns to determine the
> other positions in the TOTAL ART WORK OF THE FUTURE
> SOCIAL ORDER. Self-determination and participation in the
> cultural sphere (freedom); in the structuring of laws
> (democracy); and in the sphere of economics (socialism). Self-
> administration and decentralization (three-fold structure) occurs:
> FREE DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM (903).

This is the spinal concept of Beuys' critiques of the hegemonic social and economic

order and is central to his understanding of the role of art and the artist in the social

structure. As Michaud observes, <"Each man is an artist" does not mean that everyone

is a good painter. It means, says Beuys, man's possibility of self-determination> (36).

This means, that the term art in this setting does not refer to the technically professional

usage of a medium, instead it is a way to form and express the self, indeed to form the

social structure. According to Michaud, Beuys was more interested "in the type of

theory that releases energy in people, leading them to a general discussion of actual

problems" (42). This understanding of art relates to the concept of the public sphere as

developed by Jürgen Habermas. The artist generates public debate to find bottom-up

solutions, to activate people in the formation of a public body and of the self. Beuys

importantly states about his own practice:

> I found it necessary to go on with a research enterprise and with
> a political movement related to every field of the society. Not
> only towards the ecological problems in democracy, but also to
> the freedom problem in creativity and then later in economics
> also; to change the whole understanding of capital (quoted in
> Adams 27-28).

Beuys defines creativity as something "related to the self-conscious 'I', which stands

in the field of inner freedom" (Adams 28). This statement shows his opinion about the

free self, as the basis of human creativity, which forms society. As he argued in 1985,

> CAPITAL is at present the work sustaining ability. Money is not
> an economic value though. The two genuine economic values
> involve the connection between ability (creativity) and product.
> That explains the formula presenting the expanded concept of
> art: ART=CAPITAL (quoted by Walker Art Center).

He thus approaches politics and art, as two deeply related fields, in order to equalize the

capital of art in a democratic way and make citizens able to express their opinion and to

develop a healthier society. His statement, "[w]e do not need all that we are meant to

buy today to satisfy profit-based private capitalism" (2010: quoted by Walker Art

Center) is a clear critique of the capitalist, consumerist society. Beuys argued about his

own educational practice, that "[t]o be a teacher is my greatest work of art (quoted by

Walker Art Center). As Rojas points out, Beuys' works are "dominated by the discourse

on relational aesthetics and socially engaged art practices, Beuys theory of social

sculpture, and his relationship to Fluxus" (2010: Walker Art Center webpage). The

Walker Art Center's website points out that Beuys developed a new method of teaching,

in which teachers and learners were equal and considers that the concept of *Action

Third Path* functioned "as a bridge beyond capitalism and communism that could bring

solidarity to the economic life", to attain 'free democratic socialism'.

In a relevant comment Germer says that Beuys "defined the artist's task as one of

making people aware of their creativity [… and t]he goal of this sculptural-political

process was defined as a reorganization of society in a fundamentally democratic

fashion" (68). If the role of an artist is to motivate free creativity; in Germer'

understanding Beuys argued, "that instead of repeatedly demonstrating the futility of the

separation between the artistic and social spheres, artists should apply their conception

of extended creativity directly to society" (69). This last notion is crucial in order to connect art and society. Germer argues that with the concept of *Gesamtkunstwerk* he "wanted to reconcile aesthetically what had remained irreconcilable in society", and used art as a solution for social problems (72). Yet Germer also criticizes Beuys because he

> renounced the fiction of the work of art as an autonomous whole and attempted to escape the social restrictions of artistic practice by regressing to a presocietal state. [… T]he question of the social relevance of artistic practice […] allowed Beuys to acknowledge the particularity of his art objects while still claiming universality for his practice as a whole (72).

These critiques of the notion of universality are coherent with critiques of aesthetics value regime. As Germer sees it,

> [t]he concept of universal creativity prohibits the artist from recognizing the actual social function of artistic practice, since it blurs the boundaries between art and society, thus making it impossible to reflect on the institutional limitations of artistic production (73).

His point is important in order to understand the relationship between society, art and institutional representation, which was the central question, but also the failure of Beuys' practice. As Adams concludes, Beuys' heritage is a "conscious dialogue regarding a social reform in three independent spheres, maintaining a free cultural and educational life, a democratic equality of rights, and a new cooperative economics" (34). Or, as Castles argues, Beuys "wanted to develop a novel concept of total art that reflected the social problems of society [… and to use it, as] a healing process in the entire social organism" (927). Beuys had a mission, which he tried to accomplish through his artistic and educational practice. As Rojas also points out, Beuys' <"activist" approach demonstrates he is more concerned with social change (politics) than with the transformation of art (aesthetics)>. Beuys's works are "dominated by the discourse in

relation aesthetics and socially engaged art practices", showing a deep connection with Fluxus. This is important in order to understand why Beuys' practice failed. He was not able to choose the right form and approach to attain free creativity and democracy. In Kuspit's opinion

> Beuys tried to make himself answerable to his audience by presenting himself to it as its healer, but in the end he only staged his own tragedy [...and h]e is really more interested in finding and helping himself through his audience than in reaching out to and helping others through his art (97).

Kuspit also observes that Beuys wanted to solve his own personal problems in a narcissistic way, tried "to confirm his charisma, that is, to continue to believe in himself" (97-98). This is in antagonistic relation to Beuys' self-identification as the advocate of free expression.

By describing every human as an artist Beuys tried to break out from a traditional exclusive and elitist aesthetic value regime of art. He did not directly criticize art and its institutions as other avant-garde movements did, but created a fully new basis for art: argued for free creativity. In his understanding, all humans should be free in their self-expression. This approach completely denies any kind of hierarchy between artists and spectators. The universal notion of evaluation of cultural goods is also questioned in this way. Beuys agreed with the American Fluxus about the concept of non aesthetic aesthetic and non art art. Parallel to his fight against 'European, romantic aesthetic theory' he also argued against 'American mass consumption'. Like members of the Fluxus movement Beuys also attacked aesthetic standards of creation and describes them as a danger to the freedom of expression.

In his political theory Beuys based everything on the autonomous individual. This is a bottom-up notion of society and its governance, in fact a definition of participatory

democracy. The organizations which Beuys established or was involved with advocated human creativity and democracy. For him these were 'social sculpture' as a continuously changing organism in the fluxes of a living society, the depended on the creativity of the individuals. As an example Beuys advocated a very democratic model of education, where teachers and learners are equal and the former only create frameworks for debate, rather than transmitting knowledge frontally. The values of the aesthetic tradition are denied and the only thing that can replace them is the opinion of free individuals.

On the other hand, Beuys described himself as a shaman, a traditional doctor of self and of society who connects people to the mythic forces of nature. This self-describtion resulted from his connection to nature in the post-World War 2 traumatized society. This self-representation is questionable in view of his democratic understanding of society. His notion of equal humans' direct democracy should preclude any kind of hierarchy. His narcissism is a problematic point in his practice. Surely he should not form society in his own image – like he used wax to create a self-mask – but only create the environment for the 'expanded concept of art'.

Fluxus and especially Beuys argued against the notion of universality and of the hegemonic value regime, but this position was nearly theoretical. On the other hand Beuys' understanding of human creativity tends towards the total autonomy of the individual. In this case his autonomous artistic practice fits into his theories, but his works can't be described as a form of political statement, but only as individual creativity. His theory and practice do not fit together as Beuys' works and their representation have a highly exclusive nature, are not accessible and do not advocate free creativity. Beuys criticised modernist, mass consumerist and capitalist society. On the one hand, as a support of individualism he argued against the dominant players in

the cultural market, but on the other hand he himself acted as a self made hegemon. Beuys' support of individualism always ended up in the formation of different autonomous communities. In my understanding, Beuys did not argue in general against the products of the cultural industry, but criticized them only if they decrease the creativity of the individual. Warhol criticized more the taste of the masses, whereas Beuys criticized the structure of mass production. Warhol criticized aesthetic art through popular culture and stayed inside the field of high art. But Beuys evaluates the individual's creativity, which is in an ideally democratic cultural sphere equal to popular culture. The effectiveness of Beuys' practice deeply depends on his accessibility and on the success of 'communicating messages'. In this case the institutional representation and mediation of his works do not have an obviously positive effect, because they can decrease accessibility. Beuys' goal was to reform society and to influence all parts of the world, but some of his works were only part of his individualist, narcissistic creativity, influenced by his personal experiences (as Kuspit remarked) and so could not effectively affect a wider society. These works were institutionalized and understood as another avant-garde approach, posing questions about art itself. Beuys' notion of art can serve cultural democracy by positing that everybody's creativity is equally valuable and that individual freedom could form a healthier society. This is very close to the definition of free creativity and cultural diversity. It also denies any kind of distinction between high and participatory culture. Beuys was also an advocate of democracy by establishing autonomous organizations, working towards a participative society. His wish to see all humans as creative artists represents a new, democratic level of universality. On the other hand, his self-positioning and use of inaccessible forms decreased his impact and finally made his revolution unsuccessful.

Beuys' advocacy projects were only partly able to break out from the frames of the high cultural sphere, but the forms he used, the institutionalization of his practice and his self-understanding as a shaman did not promote a more participatory cultural sphere and did not make his own practice accessible. Beuys was one of the most progressive artists of the neo avant-garde movements, but he failed to support free creativity and democratic society.

Manifesto:

2. To affect, or bring to a certain state, by subjecting to, or treating with, a flux. "*Flured* into another world." *South.*
3. *Med.* To cause a discharge from, as in purging.

flux (flŭks), *n.* [OF., fr. L. *fluxus*, fr. *fluere*, *fluxum*, to flow. See FLUENT; cf. FLUSH, *n.* (of cards).] **1.** *Med.* **a** A flowing or fluid discharge from the bowels or other part: esp., an excessive and morbid discharge: as, the bloody *flux*, or dysentery. **b** The matter thus discharged.

Purge the world of bourgeois sickness, "intellectual", professional & commercialized culture, PURGE the world of dead art, imitation, artificial art, abstract art, illusionistic art, mathematical art, — PURGE THE WORLD OF "AMERICANISM"

2. Act of flowing: a continuous moving on or passing by, as of a flowing stream; a continuing succession of changes.
3. A stream; copious flow; flood; outflow.
4. The setting in of the tide toward the shore. Cf. REFLUX.
5. State of being liquid through heat; fusion. *Rare.*

PROMOTE A REVOLUTIONARY FLOOD AND TIDE IN ART, Promote living art, anti-art, promote NON ART REALITY to be fully grasped by all peoples, not only critics, dilettantes and professionals.

7. *Chem. & Metal.* **a** Any substance or mixture used to promote fusion, esp. the fusion of metals or minerals. Common metallurgical fluxes are silica and silicates (acidic), lime and limestone (basic), and fluorite (neutral). **b** Any substance applied to surfaces to be joined by soldering or welding, just prior to or during the operation, to clean and free them from oxide, thus promoting their union, as rosin.

FUSE the cadres of cultural, social & political revolutionaries into united front & action.

Illustration 1: Joseph Beuys, Manifesto, 1970. Alteration of George Maciunas' Fluxus Manifesto, February 1963. From 1. Karton, Edition Hundermark, Berlin 1970. 30 x 21 cm, image by historyofourworld.wordpress.com

1.5. Institutional Construction of the Past

This section is dedicated to the formation of the past, as a collective action governed by public institutions. This function is relevant for the understanding of the role of public cultural institutions.

According to Pierre Nora history can be understood as a social scientific critical discourse, reconstructing the past; while memory represents a private, individual viewpoint, blurred with and originated from everyday life experiences (3; 6). "Memory is always a phenomenon of the present, a bond tying us to the eternal present; history is a representation of the past" (3). As Schwarz similarly argues, "we are witnessing an unprecedented politicization of memory, such that public engagement with memory is taking on new and more complex forms" (Radstone, 2). On mediated memory Schwarz also argues that it "blurs the distinctions, not only between individual memory and public discourses, but also between specific processes of production, distribution, and reception" (Radstone, 6-7). He also quotes Plumb about the creation of a more democratic civil society,

> [t]he past is always a created ideology with a purpose, designed to control individuals, or motivate societies, or inspire classes. […] The past has only served the few; perhaps history may serve the multitude (Radstone, 45-46).

In Schwarz's understanding of the debate, "modern life has broken attachments to the past and [...] new ways need to be invented to revivify what has been lost" (Radstone, 48). As he observes,

> new institutions devoted to recovering what has been lost, creating new, ersatz memory-forms — performed rather than lived, mediated rather than unmediated — that replicate, at varying removes, what had once been vital and replete (51-53).

Schwarz's points – mostly by referring to Nora, Plumb and Schorske – are basic in

understating the crisis of memory in post-modernity and the role of institutionalization.

As Olick quotes Halbwachs, it "is in society that people normally acquire memories. It is also in society that they recall, recognize, and localize their memories" (12). According to Assmann, collective memory is based on everyday communications; cultural memory has a clear distance from everyday life (127; 129), as "the store of knowledge", which cannot preserve the past, but reconstructs it. He continues by stating that cultural memory is formed and organized by different institutions (130-131). As Dessí states,

> [i]n every society and every country, the collective memory transmitted to the young by the older generation, through a variety of channels (e.g. school textbooks, the media, monuments and commemorative rituals) (2). [… A] multi-cultural democracy in which each group provides 'checks and balances' that limit the scope for other groups to transmit their preferred version of the past (6).

As the author later observes, the manipulation of the transmitted past can be beneficial "by fostering optimism about the value of existing cultural norms and institutions and thereby encouraging investments which generate important social externalities" (30). Langenbacher and Dandelet also argue, that collective memory is a 'mediated narrative', which is driven by an elite (4-5). They argue that Nora's distinction between memory and history is untenable, because history is never value-natural (5). As they observe, elites interpret and respond to the bottom-up forms of memory. The authors argue that memory often emerges as part of the public coping process in the context of a free, pluralist regime that has reached a degree of consolidation and institutionalized stability.

Anderson's concept of imagined communities describes the role of the past in the construction of modern social frameworks. As the author observes, all non-local communities are imagined, "because the members of even the smallest nation will never

know most of their fellow-members" (15). The author describes how language and mediation made this imagination possible. Anderson's argument is relevant to understanding the basic function of public institutions in mediated community formation.

Heritage can be understood as the preserved collection of objects, representing a certain discourse of the past. Smith's argument describes the changing role of heritage in community formation and legitimation and observes different, parallel discourses of heritage with different power, serving different interests. She states that

> '[h]eritage is therefore ultimately a cultural practice, involved in the construction and regulation of a range of values and understandings [… and] there is a hegemonic 'authorized heritage discourse', which is reliant on the power/knowledge claims of technical and aesthetic experts, and institutionalized in state cultural agencies and amenity societies. […] The 'authorized heritage discourse' privileges monumentality and grand scale, innate artefact/site significance tied to time depth, scientific/aesthetic expert judgement, social consensus and nation building (11).

As Smith continues, some people are authorized to participate in the discourse which drives the management of material culture (12). Referring to Harvey's he points out that when "heritage is involved in the production of identity, power and authority are obscured" (17). As Smith observes, "[m]useums took on a regulatory role in helping to establish and govern both social and national identity" (18). Education "about the value and meaning of historic buildings and monuments" is a way to govern the public (19). She also claims that the aesthetic argument of preserving certain objects and buildings is highly political:

> [t]he authorized heritage discourse (AHD) focuses attention on aesthetically pleasing material objects, sites, places and/or landscapes that current generations 'must' care for, protect and revere so that they may be passed to nebulous future generations for their 'education', and to forge a sense of common identity

> based on the past (29), [... which] explicitly promotes the experience and values of elite social classes (30).

According to Smith, there is a "top-down relationship between expert, heritage site and 'visitor', in which the expert 'translates' [...] the site and its meanings to the visitor" (34). Smith also points out that the universalized representation of the hegemonic heritage discourse is passively and uncritically consumed (32-34). Cultural institutions and professionals have the "power to define how the past is used to legitimize (or not) certain forms of identity" (36). Referring to Pendlebury, the author argues that heritage needs to be community consultation based, recognizing the diversity of the society (37-38). "By identifying all heritage as either elitist and/or commercially inspired pastiche, little conceptual room is made for alternative uses of heritage" (41), which is a form of cultural exclusion. Moreover, "participation in heritage events or the simple act of visiting sites is an embodiment or active statement of identity in which visitors become embroiled in a performance for which they are also audience" (68).

The above scholars have described different crises of memory, which provide a foundation for my argument: historical science replaces individual memory; history is not natural; the past is not lived anymore but mediated; the formation of the past legitimates the present and future of the imagined communities; collective memory is formed in through an open public debate; all public institutions – representing a certain understanding of the past – are politically governed by an elite; the heritage discourse is also dominated by a certain elite; the constructed past serves the interest of the leading elite. This elite is able to spread a certain notion of the past by leading 'public' institutions. Observing such problems is not enough, they need to be considered in relation to the democratic political framework.

We need to connect the construction of the past – within its crises – to the concept of

the democratic political system and try to indicate how the past should be formed to serve public interest in a democratic framework.

As Langenbacher and Dandelet state, "collective memory [… is an] essential component of democratization processes" and memory can flourish only in a democratic system (3). Their thesis is that

> collective memory and open discussions about a past are strongly related to democratization, while simultaneously revealing that different balances, measures and types of public discussions characterize each country (4). […] Memory flourishes in a democracy because transparency is central to legitimacy and because democracies are by definition quasi-therapeutic political systems (13-14).

According to Misztal, "memory is important for democratic community for three reasons: to guarantee justice, to achieve its potential, and to secure its continuation" (1320). The author observes that "the nature of relationships between memory and democracy entered public debates partly because of political apologies for past wrongdoings" (1322). She also points out, that new democracies raise issues about the role of collective memory in the institutionalization between democracy (1322). Misztal points out that forgetting builds new cohesions and that, by legitimizing myths and propaganda "collective memory might become an obstacle to democracy because groups compete for recognition of suffering, undermining the democratic spirit of cooperation" (1326). By referring to Ricoeur the author argues that

> healthy democracy welcomes collective memory from narrators whose credibility always can be questioned, balanced with the critical, scientific, and objective distance achieved by checking documents and archives, which inform us of the 'facts' of what happened (1327-28).

Furthermore, she argues that

> a society draws a coherent identity from its communal memory, communal memory is the essential element in the process of

44

activization of civil society, without which a democratic system
cannot achieve its full potential;

thus shared individual memories build a confirmed notion of the past and enrich the democratic system (1329). Se emphasises "that democratic regimes do not need to recruit memory to secure their legitimacy, because a democracy anchors its legitimacy in the election" (1330). As the author continues, the "open-ended, nonfixed, nonpoliticized collective memory is good for cooperative relationships", where civil society plays a central role (1331). It is important that "collective memory of the democratic experience helps continue the legitimization of democracy and respect for its institutions and cultivates values of moderation" (1333). As regards contemporary diverse social frameworks Misztal observes, that

they may witness a cosmopolitization of their national collective
memory. If the significance of national memories are diluted or
fragmented, they lose their significance, then democratic
memories are also less important (1334). [… E]ach generation
has the authority to remake history (1335).

As Van Beek states, in a democratic historical culture "[t]he underlying idea is to interpret the past on the basis of equality and the freedom to use one's own reason" (1). The author observes that in a democratic society, it might be difficult to handle the undemocratic past (2). Importantly, she distinguishes between exclusive and inclusive formation of collective memory and argues that the inclusive and democratic approach creates open and alternative visions of the future (2-3). The author also points out that the truth of the past depends on identity and it "is not an end in itself; […] but a part in the process of healing" (6; 9) in order to build a new democracy.

A democratic society cannot be based on an institutionally constructed notion of the past. In order to eliminate this danger these institutions need to define their aims in a democratic manner.

1.5.1. Institutional Construction and Representation of Identity and Value

In this section we explore how states – via public institutions – over-represent certain value regimes and try to govern the identity of the individuals. What do different scholars have to say about the ways in which institutions represent hegemonic value regime and form identity in particular ways? According to Huyssen, for example,

> [t]he purely institutional critique along the lines of power-knowledge-ideological apparatus, which operates from the top down, needs to be complemented by a bottom-up perspective that investigates spectator desire and subject inscriptions, audience response, interest groups, and the segmentation of overlapping public spheres addressed by a large variety of museums and exhibition practices today (17).

This argument for 'non-institutional' public institutions with a bottom-up nature is basic to grasping the potential of more inclusive approaches. Huyssen thinks that there is a dialectic connection between modernity and museums (19), which is the basis of the conflicts between the freedom of identity formation, creativity and institution. His hypothesis is

> that in the age of the postmodern the museum has not simply been restored to a position of traditional cultural authority, as some critics would have it, but that it is currently undergoing a process of transformation that may signal, in its own small and specific way, the end of the traditional museum/modernity dialectic (21).

According to Arjun Appadurai and Carol A. Breckenridge the

> collections and exhibitions cannot be divorced from the larger cultural context of philanthropy and ethic or national identity formation [... and] museums contribute to the larger process by which popular culture us formed (Evans 405). [… P]roblems associated with ethnicity and social identity, nostalgia, and the search for 'museumized' authenticity, to the tension between the interests states have in fixing local (sic) identities and the pressures localities exert in seeking to transform such identities. The result is a number of contradictory pressures, some toward

fixing and stabilizing group identities through museums (406).

As the authors point out, top-down formation and institutionalization of identity does not allow natural changes and maintains pressure on citizens. They conclude that <museums everywhere seem to be increasingly caught up with mass media experiences [...and] seem to be booming as the "heritage industry" takes off> (418). As Appadurai notes elsewhere, the cultural economy can be understood only as a global system (1996: 32), where "group pasts become increasingly parts of museums, exhibits, and collections, both in national and transnational spectacles" (44).

Sharon Macdonald argues that museums "are significant sites in which to examine some of the claims of identity transformation" (6). The way in which these institutions transform or represent is crucial both for identity of individuals and communities. As the author concludes her article,

> a museological experiment in the representation of transnational identity has many counterparts in museums established in other locations whose aim is precisely to try to articulate the kind of bounded identity model, replete with autonomous and progressive history (10).

Referring to James Clifford, Macdonald argues that museums play a key role in the recognition of global identities. As he points out, "museums might be suitable for this kind of identity work too is not, perhaps, surprising in retrospect because, of course, they have long been 'contact zones'" (10).

The book *National Museums in a Global World* is very helpful in understanding the conflict between national identity and the cosmopolitan worldview as it pertains to museums. As Saphinaz-Amal Naguib observes, the contemporary challenges of "collecting and displaying remain crucial to a museum's existence and the history of collections and their use in exhibitions provide insights into the systems and processes

that shape national identity and collected memories" (Bugge, 7). Cecilia Axelsson points out the highly recent and relevant problem of the contemporary museum by saying that <in a multi-cultural setting and in societies with clearly defined policies of democracy, equality and multi-culturalism, a common and official "national identity" is no longer so easily defined> (Bugge, 92). Viviane Gosselin similarly points out that "[b]y confronting contemporary and sensitive social issues […, which] are not part of the classical museography, the museum is involved in the process of producing culture rather than simply reproducing it" (Bugge, 137).

What is the role of institutions in identity formation and representation? As Bourdieu, Darbel and Schnapper argued, taste and habitus depends on education, economic and social context. The authors disagree with "Kant's phrase that 'the beautiful is that which pleases without concept'" (Carbonell, 432). Their sociological research led them to contest cultivated taste and they argued that

> 'realized aesthetic' or, more precisely, culture (of a class or era) become nature, that the judgment of taste […] can become a subjective experience which appears to be free. [… They argue, that] museums betray their true function, which for some the feeling of belonging and for others the feeling of exclusion [… and] the ability to appropriate the works of art, have the privilege of making freedom (434).

The "*monopoly* of the manipulation of cultural goods and the institutional signs" (434) form taste, the recognition of value depends on the habitus, which represents and reproduces one cultural power structure. In relation to this point Bennet also observes that museums are key places for "showing and telling," and for "organized walking in which an intended message is communicated in the form of a (more or less) directed itinerary" (6). As Huyssen argues "the articulation of tradition and nation, heritage and canon, and [...] the master maps for the construction of cultural legitimacy in both a national and a universalist sense" (13) is created by collections, museums and

institutions. At the same time "[t]he museum's role as site of an elitist conservation, a bastion of tradition and high culture gave way to the museum as mass medium" (14), which represents and supports the values of the elite. Moreover museums are key players in contemporary society by creating history, past and memory. As Huyssen concludes, "modernity is unthinkable without its museal project" (15).

As Thomas argues, identity can't be simplified to its national components and the mobile populations have more complex ways to construct the self (Isar and Anheier, 2011). As the author quotes Bennett, "museums may do little to address racialized forms of social conflict arising from the relations between sections of the white working and lower middle classes", because on the social and economic levels globalization has different effects. In connection to this point Heraud argues that "[i]mmigration itself touches on the question of identity, and notably on national identity" (107). As Thomas cites Ang, "having a heritage is indispensable to having a distinctive identity and cultural memory; losing a heritage is like losing a key bit of both" (Isar and Anheier, 2011: 213). As Thomas emphasizes, the construction of memory deeply impacts the formation of identity. As the author later quotes Chen, "[m]emories are not passively received in the museum; they are actively recalled and constructed" (Isar and Anheier, 2011: 214).

As arguments essential to the comparison of the concept of cultural democracy and the practice of public institutions, especially where it incorporates the digital environment into the discourse, is made by Nancy Thumum. As the author observes

> in the context of a world apparently full of self-representations by 'ordinary people', it is a crucial question whether self-representation within publicly funded institutions is more or less democratic than the apparently less constrictive environment of Web 2.0. On balance, the evidence presented here suggests that there are distinct advantages to invited, facilitated self-

representations at the behest of publicly funded cultural institutions (634).

Referring to Yúdice, Kylie Message argues that

> any pairing of contemporary museums or museum-like activities or events with democracy now requires a consideration of the changing concept of citizenship (265) [...and] the centrality of museums and the cultural sector means that museums are uniquely placed to provide the terms as well as the venue to continue as active participants in this conversation between policy-makers and publics (275).

These points are fundamental for recognizing the important role of public debate in the formation of identity.

The last chapter of Gerard's *Heritage, Museum and Galleries* includes some relevant articles about the shift of institutional practice toward cultural democracy. Andrew Newman argues about social exclusion that it has become a central issue of contemporary cultural institutions (Gerard 325). As he observes, institutions need to have an inclusive approach toward the broader community based identities for "[c]ultural property appears to play an integral part in the process of identity construction and in the formation of 'discourses' for people and their communities" (331). According to David Thelen these connections should open up more between museums and civic sphere, which includes both individuals and communities.

> Museums will need to listen to whether, as well as how, members of community-based organizations wish to engage museums on issues of partnership and the building of a civic society […, moreover] museum professionals must reflect among themselves about the internal challenges they contemplate or explore making civic engagement partnership core mission of their institutions (338).

Through a case study Portia James shows one way of representing a community-based identity. The author argues that

> [t]he future [of museums] lies not so much in bigger buildings

and facilities, program auditoriums, exhibition spaces, and larger artifact repositories, but in the uncharted waters of relationship. There must be stronger bridges between the museum – as both an intellectual and a public institution – and its claimed communities (355).

As the above literature review shows, there are fundamental problems in institutional practice. Institutions and their policies are working with the concept of cultural democratization not that of cultural democracy, as their goal is to provide access to some cultural goods in the 'canon'. These issues can be explored and illustrated through an analysis of two major French public cultural institutions.

1.5.2. Cité Nationale de l'Histoire de l'Immigration (CNHI)

In this section we review the written materials of CNHI. According to Thomas, "[i]n France, cultural policy actively envisions the role of national museums as media to preserve and propagate the 'patrimoine' – the national heritage – as cultural model" (Isar and Anheier, 2011: 217). As the author observes, in France the understanding of citizenship, identity and culture is typically top-down. As the mini-guide of the CNHI states, the institution replaced the former *Colonial Exhibition*, which was opened to represent the image of a "greater France sought to demonstrate the benefit of colonisation". As the brochure argues, the surrounding 'place' with the Minerva statue and the building itself symbolize colonial France. As the brochure of CNHI states on the front page, the institution's aim "is to increase awareness and recognition of the history of immigration to France since the 19th century" (CNHI brochure). The brochure separates the exhibition into three parts: "the experience of immigration, the reason of leaving, […] living spaces, work, school, […] the acquisition of French nationality [… as a] contribution of the very different cultures". The text describes France as the land of opportunities. Even through the brochure critiques stereotypes, the discourse makes

use of many ideas that are stereotyped in nature. The brochure states, for example, that "[p]eople do not erase their past by leaving their country", which is an important observation regarding the multilevel cosmopolitan identity. About the role of immigrants in society, the document argues, that "immigrants of both sexes have contributed to the construction and modernisation of France", which shows a quite inclusive approach. On the other hand, about the importance of public education, the text argues that it "has been vital for socialization and integration", which is a point against the recognition of the diversity of identities. This shows an expectation of conforming to the majority, which is problematic in relation to free choice in self-formation. "[S]port serves as a bridge to the host society, a way of learning its codes, manners and social customs", a statement which is highly stereotypical. For example, the brochure does focus on intellectuals who are immigrants, instead only poor and less educated immigrants are evoked. About the *Contemporary Issues Room* the brochure argues that "[a]ccurate facts and definitions enable everyone to better understand the issues of the current debate".

The website of the museum includes the same materials as the printed brochures, simply supplemented with some multimedia elements and information about the wide variety of partly relevant programs, which offer a more impressive view of the institution. The website is available only in French, which is quite problematic in the case of an institution which is dedicated to people from different backgrounds. I do not argue for English, but more obviously for Arabic or Chinese, both relevant in light of the background of the immigrations to France.

Marie Poinsot, editorial representative of CNHI, argued in an interview I had with her that the institution tries to stand back from recent political debates about

immigration and at the same time aims to influence public discourse. On the other hand, as an institution which is funded by the *Ministry of Culture and by the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-Development*, it has to act according to the political agendas of both. According to Poinsot the institution does not directly target any visitor segment, but most of the visitors are higher educated with a 'middle class' background. She points out, however, that on the other hand the institution aims to communicate with people of immigration background or living in areas of the country where immigrant numbers are highest. As she stated, civil society is involved in the work of the museum through a network of advocacy organizations that are active in the field of immigration. In the interview Poinsot described identity in its cosmopolitan understanding, but it does not seem that the museum represents this approach.

Another means of public outreach is the CNHI educational project, which has already given support enabling to 2,000 teachers to teach the history of and to handle questions raised by immigration. This appears to be a practical way to spread the institution's messages.

The museum's architecture functions as a readable text with its own messages. The building plays a central role in the understanding of the institution. The still viewable past of the building is the first problematic point, as the new institution is re-using it without any reflection, re-contextualization and critique of the colonial era. It has not thought out the question of how the built environment might redefine the mission and messages of the museum. This could be a good opportunity to rethink the heritage of greater France – including the colonialist notion of nation and territory – but the CNHI does not deal with this issue. The building creates the impression that the institution accepts this heritage without any kind of critique or even commentary. This absence of

any distance from the colonial understanding of nation and immigration is highly problematic in the contemporary framework. The surrounding space, the motifs on the facade, the monumentality, the representative rooms, and even the aquarium connect immigrants to the exotic in a stereotypical way. On the main floor there is a small room to record and send video messages about yourself and about the museum. This is a very positive, participative step. To ask only the city, but not the state of origin might be problematic in an immigration museum. The service is also not available or editable online.

The exhibition space starts with graphs of immigration from the nineteenth century. This creates the false notion that immigration started only in that historical period, instead of describing migration as a phenomenon that has always existed. This shows the deep relation between the nationalist discourse and the notion of immigration. The date also relates to the emergence of nation states, which might be problematic as this defines migrants as 'other', as outsiders.

In addition, the exhibition includes a historic time-line with diverse visual elements. The pictures usually show 'poor' refugees in a stereotypic context, like trains, camps and barbed wire. The installation of a huge bunk bed and luggage conveys the same feeling. It may well be that immigrants are in many cases refugees or are poor. However as the only representation this one is unacceptable because this one portrays all the immigrants schematically and negatively. If the institution wants to serve as a bridge between immigrants and locals, it could be more inclusive in order to function as a space of cultural translation and debate. Showing only pictures of blockhouses, graffiti making kids and protesters is also stereotypical in this context. Sport is an important way to change social status, but should not be the most emphasized way.

In general CNHI represents all immigrants stereotypically and denies any kind of participation and therefore unable to serve its public function. It creates the feeling of otherness, which is not the appropriate message. It defines both 'local' and immigrant identities in ways that are not likely to reduce conflict. The representation of immigrants and 'Frenchness' partly exclude the cosmopolitan approach. Mostly because of its stereotypical approach CNHI is not able to make cultural translation between the different identities of the community. This approach is not democratic and does not let visitors freely form their identities.

As a possible solution visitors could be invited to bring objects or upload pictures about their own experiences and personal life. This would balance the top-down approach and the nationalistic understanding and misrepresentations of immigration.

Illustration 2: The CNHI building, photo by the author

Illustration 3: The facade of the CNHI, photo by the author

Illustration 4: The CNHI exhibition space, photo by www.museumsblog.de

Illustration 5: The CNHI exhibition space, photo by www.museumsblog.de

Illustration 6: Vidéomaton at the CNHI, photo by the author

Illustration 7: Vidéomation at the CNHI, photo by the author

1.5.3. Cité de la Musique

The *Cité de la Musique* is located in the *Cité de la Villette*, which is a revitalized endorse in a peripheral part of Paris that now contains a wide variety of cultural institutions. Its overall mission, which is to revitalize this part of the town, to develope the local community and establish a deeper relationship with people from other locations represents a positive approach.

The present museum opened its doors to the public in 1997. It offers 400 concerts yearly, a media library, and different activities for both adults and children. As the brochure states, "[a] Cité or community is a place for discussion. Resolutely open to the world, the Cité de la Musique is a national and international reference center" (Cité de la Musique brochure). The institution claims to be open to all musical genres and audiences as they are aware of the diversity of music. As an important element, they offer music education for all generations, which is a very important activity to open up the cultural sphere for the wider public. According to the website, the museum offers guided visits and "every day musicians come to play among the collections and speak about their instruments". As the brochure points out, the museum is "a point of convergence between living music and the preservation of historical collections, the Museum's vocation is also to establish a dialogue between the public, historians, musicians and instrument makers".

These goals would fit perfectly into the conditions of cultural democracy, but in fact, as we shall show, are not completely achieved. For example, the museum offers concerts, but does not offer 'open mic' events, which would be more participatory and inclusive. Moreover, the museum over-represents a certain value regime in a semi-accessible manner instead of supporting the diversity of expression. Public institutions

such as the *Cité de la Musique* should be the sphere to debate the evaluation of cultural goods, yet visitors are more 'receivers of culture'. Furthermore the museum translates only one understanding of cultural value for the public.

As with the CNHI, the architecture of the building and the structure of the exhibition space are highly communicative elements. These signs determine the very messages an institution coveys, and space can be understood as a readable text, as the rhetoric of the institution's argument. Next to the monumental transition space of the entrance there is a French flag, which is understandable in the case of a French public funded institution, but becomes problematic in the case of the represented values. This can be understood as a way to connect France to 'the palace' of music, which can represent some exclusion of music with different origins. From the entry hall going through the shop visitors can enter to and exit the museum space. This organization of the space - using the shop as a frame of the exhibition space - highlights the relation between valued, exhibited and sellable art. The shop mostly sells and plays 'classical' music, which is its first attack against the open understanding of cultural value and diversity.

The exhibition space is quite dark, which creates a mysterious atmosphere. The silence of the music museum also supports the sacred atmosphere which is quite problematic as it separates daily life and visitors from the 'temple of art'. As the research has shown in previous sections, there is no need to distinguish between art and life, between 'artist' and 'human' or even between the spaces of culture and life.

As they state, "[t]he mission […] is to conserve, display and make available its collections of [mostly] musical instruments". The exhibition consists only of instruments in display cabinets. Few of the instruments can be touched, which supports the feeling that an 'average visitor' is not on the level of the artists who can play them.

From the side of preservation this approach is reasonable, but this leads to the misunderstanding of the institution's public role. This approach only creates the mysterious authenticity and originality of the objects, but does not create awareness of the cultural value of these instruments. The preservation of the instruments as objects impedes the mission of cultural translation, active participation and education. The aim of preservation is valuable, but is different from the very concept of public cultural institutions.

Before visitors enter the exhibition space, they are able to pick up an audio guide, available in three languages, also with special materials for children. This is very important to help understand the exhibited materials, to create real intellectual access. The audio guide allows visitors to watch documentaries of each period and to hear the sound of some of the instruments. This approach increases access, but still does not serve active participation. Moreover, the fact that the videos are the basic information sources, questions the very existence of the museum. There is an unquestionable need to make these videos available online, but we could go further and argue that without all the exhibited instruments the museum would better serve the aims of cultural translation. A website would increase access and could function as the space of participation. The fact that the instruments can't be touched only serves visual enjoyment instead of involving visitors. The images of the instruments and the video documentaries on the website would better advocate the aim of such an institution.

The exhibition follows a chronological order. Each represented century has its own floor; the historical discourse starts with the seventeenth century and ends with the twenties century on the top floor. After a brief presentation of ancient Greek music – as the only origin of modern music – the exhibition starts with a humanistic presentation of

opera. This start conveys the feeling that the music of antiquity is not related to anything that existed before or came after, despite the fact that the origins of seventeenth century art can be directly traced to it. This excludes a huge number of relevant periods and approaches to music, such as folk music. To start with the seventeenth century is also problematic, if the institution aims to represent itself as the 'museum of music' overall.

The music of the seventeenth century is represented on the next floor in a much bigger and more open space. The authenticity is supported with paintings on the wall, representing the elitist approach of the baroque period without any critical reflection. The nineteenths century is represented in another more tiny and dark space again. By taking the stairs from the nineteenth century exhibition space, visitors arrive at the last floor. The space of the twentieth century is open and visitors can look down to the previous floors, which represent the deep connection to the nineteenths century. At this point visitor might feel that they are at the end of the exhibition, but by taking the small stairs down, they arrive at a narrow corridor.

On this corridor there are three small glass cases, representing all the 'Western' popular music of the twentieth century through jazz, chanson and rock. There is a wide variety of reasons why this point of the exhibition is very problematic. During the exhibition this is the first point at which something obviously not 'high culture' is represented. First of all, this constellation gives the feeling, that popular culture is 'below the standards' of the previously represented 'high culture'. Second, in this representation, popular music is not an organic part of the bigger context and of the complex discourse of music. This is an obviously false and exclusive understanding of the situation. Third – as in the whole museum – there is no connection made to European folk music. This point of the exhibition forms and implies a questionable

value hierarchy. This represents that individuals who – according to their habitus and identity – prefer 'popular music' are not as qualified, as others. As we have argued in the previous sections this approach does not seem appropriate a public institution. This representation of values gives access to something top-down, but excludes a wide variety of different opinions.

At the end of the corridor, after going through a tiny, dark and mysterious transition space, visitors can enter 'another world', the music of the world section. It is a hidden side exhibition, which implies that in the 'great discourse' and 'straight development' of European music, a world music section is almost irrelevant. This is also the representation of a certain value regime. Moreover, this is the only section of the museum where visitors get more of a sense of the social context of the music, which in this case suggests some primitivity and differentiates between 'our' and 'their' music.

This approach is exclusive and gives a false picture of value and cultural discourse. Obviously, culture – such as European high culture – is much more deeply rooted in traditional cultures, so these cultural attitudes should not be understood as side discourses, but as parallel ones. This approach can't build awareness and it is also not able to represent diversity. As the video of this section states, this type of music is disappearing, which creates the bewildering understanding that the only surviving culture is the 'European'. In fact, bottom-up created music, which is part of the daily life of the greater society, is not disappearing, only changing.

The *Cité de la Musique* represents only the music of 'European' 'high culture'. It excludes and underestimates all other evaluation systems and regimes of habitus. It is clear that to have access to these cultural goods a certain type of education is necessary, which can serve as a tool of cultural exclusion. There is here a false universality without

aiming for real intellectual access. This approach is highly questionable as it forms identities in undemocratic ways, which leads to conflicts both on the individual and the social level, and moreover between individuals and the canonical representation of values. The approach of the institution underestimates the values of most of the visitors, keeps alive an unnatural hierarchy of cultural goods and ignores the cosmopolitan reality of the world. A public institution charged with representing music in general should not over-represent certain value regimes, especially without translating these cultural goods to other systems of habitus. Such a public institutions should be used for exchange and expression, instead of 'teaching' the values of a certain part of society. According to the ideal function of public institutions in a cultural democracy, it should work on a very different basis. It should not represent values, but should ask visitors about their values and to create goods. For example, there should be a stage, where everybody is allowed to play music or instruments, which everybody could try. The *Cité de la Musique* as it is now, would be a good private representative of the music of the European elite from the seventeenth century, but it does not represent music in a free and democratic way and is not able to create public value.

Illustration 8: Facade of the Cité de la Musique, photo by the author

Illustration 9: Entrance of the Cité de la Musique, photo by the author

Illustration 10: Exhibition space of the Cité de la Musique, photo by the author

Illustration 11: Exhibition space of the Cité de la Musique, photo by the author

Illustration 12: Exhibition space of the Cité de la Musique, photo by the author

Illustration 13: Exhibition space of the Cité de la Musique, photo by the author

1.5.4. Conclusion

We have sought to demonstrate that from the viewpoint of cultural democracy both of these institutions focus on democratization as a concept more than as a category of practice. Both represent certain values and try to propagate them, but neither are open enough to include a wide variety of identities and systems of habitus, and to translate between these value regimes. There is a clear need to open these institutions to the public, to accept and include a wide variety of opinions, approaches and viewpoints. The problem originates from the politics of identity and culture, because states should not form citizens' identities, but should serve their freedom of choice. The representation of high culture serves the needs and habitus of a certain elite. The representation of 'Frenchness' fits into the traditional concept of nation state. Both are problematic in a cosmopolitan and democratic context. These institutions can't serve the public need of cultural democracy, but rather the aims of some hegemonic groups. Both their approach leads to cultural exclusion as represented by a nation-related high cultural hegemony and is far from the ideas of cosmopolitanism and democracy. As such both are highly problematic in a democratic framework. Both are oppressive, because they do not support cultural diversity. Also, they are the origins of some identity conflicts and cultural tensions, which obviously does not serve the public good. Moreover, neither of the institutions share its digital content under licences, which would allow the public – the owner of the preserved and exhibited goods – to copy, share or remix it.

1.6. Summary

The traditional aesthetic understanding of value – first of all according to Theodor W. Adorno – can be understood only in its high educated frame. This concept emerged in

the context of mass media. As Bourdieu showed, taste and evaluation depends deeply on the educational, economic and cultural background of the individual, in short on habitus, so the universal and authentic notion of value – that shared by Kant, Benjamin and Adorno - is problematic. Mass media and consumption are problematic models, not because of Adorno's argument about the 'bad' taste of the masses of individuals, but because of the malfunctions and monopolies of the cultural industry; the latter has not perfectly adapted to the taste of its consumers, it is governing it. This fact can negatively affect the taste of the individual and of the masses, but this does not mean that their taste could not be and would not be valuable in itself. Following Adorno and Bourdieu, everyone's taste is just as valuable as the taste of the consumers of aesthetically evaluated, high cultural goods. High cultural goods are also made for the market, customized to the special conditions of that market. Taste is socially constructed, the recognition of value depends on the habitus of the individual. This means that universality of cultural value can't exist; universality is only a way for certain groups to represent and reproduce their power, to form a cultural hierarchy. Originality and authenticity function as the tools of exclusion. It is seriously problematic, if public cultural institutions are used for this aim. The originality of goods is a false legitimization of value. The traditional aesthetic canon in itself does not end up in an unquestionable value regime, but the creation and reproduction of one's habitus, status and taste and leads to cultural corruption. This means that value and non-value can't be demarcated according to this method of evaluation.

The neo avant-garde on the one hand criticizes the impact of both mass consumption and the cultural industry. On the other it questions the frame and notion of high culture. Different movements and artists have tried to break out of the high cultural framework,

but usually their social impact was limited. These revolutions have always fallen back to the field of high art and were not able to bring reform. The reason was the neo avant-garde movements' approach to access and participation. The neo avant-garde movements have tried to blur the border of art and life, of high and popular culture, but were not successful given that the understanding of the avant-garde regimes requires specific knowledge. Its 'messages' were not translated for the wider public, so remained were stuck in the criticized field of high culture. As we have argued, the Fluxus movement and Joseph Beuys were the closest to the realization of cultural democracy. Public art also has some aspects that coincide with the needs of cultural democracy. Working on the basis of the neo avant-garde serves the taste and consumption needs of a small 'elite', instead of serving wider social impact. In general the neo avant-garde posed very good questions, but the given answers were not able to bring the mission to success. This lack of success originates in the difficulty of access and not in the weaknesses of the possible spectators.

The previous section has shown the misrepresentation of values and the hegemony of certain value regimes, which was supported by case studies of Beuys and of two major French cultural institutions.

2. Hegemonic Copyright Regime

This section uses different arguments to show how intellectual property rights and copyrights regimes run counter to the very nature of culture and are destroying participation and competition.

Lessig cites Stallman, who states "that an ecology of code would develop that remained free for others to build upon. His fundamental goal was freedom; innovative creative code was a byproduct" (2004: 280). As Kelty argues about the open and free

71

software movement – which can be understood as the origin of copyrights critiquing arguments – it

> is a response to a problem, in much the same way that […] the emergence of a publishing industry in the eighteenth century, and the institutions of the public sphere in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were responses (2008: 305).

Benkler, referring mostly to copyright issues points out that "social, institutional, and technical facts still leave us with quite a bit of unauthorized creative expression" (2006: 278). Lessig's argument is mostly a critique of the hegemony of law and monopolies over norms and public needs (2004: 132). "Obviously, copyright law is not the enemy. The enemy is regulation that does no good" (2004: 172). The author continues, that there is no acceptable reason why "the law should defend the old against the new" (2004: 183). He argues that like free markets, free culture depends upon competition (2004: 192). That technology is a tool of freedom because

> [s]lowly, some begin to understand that this freedom need not mean anarchy. We can carry a free culture into the twenty-first century, without artists losing and without the potential of digital technology being destroyed (2004: 271).

As the author continues, "[w]e will not reclaim a free culture by individual action alone. It will also take important reforms of laws" (2004: 287). As Lessig points out, "[t]he law should regulate certain areas of culture — but it should regulate culture only where that regulation does good" (2004: 305), which can be understood as a conclusion of his statements about the suggested changes of copyright law. Later, in the case of 'mixing' culture Lessig comments on online services, which

> "democratized" here means that access to the resource — the right to innovate — has been made more democratic, that is, made dependent upon your membership in some community, and not upon a special status or hierarchy within some company or government (2008: 141).

At this point Lessig connect the critique of the hegemonic copyrights regime to the public interest in a democratic framework. As Berry similarly argues,

> intellectual property rights is an incentive for a plurality of individuals to be able to develop an innovative and creative culture that is crucial for cultural vibrancy (that is, as a fruitful cultural democracy and public domain) (2008: 36-37).

Pinter claims that between the new conditions traditional intellectual property rights might need changes (Isar and Anheier, 2008: 85). In her opinion "[f]irst we have the traditional economy, where everything has an owner and a value, and second, the sharing economy, where more and more creative works are launching their lives in less restricted domains" (86). The author refers to different arguments against existing intellectual property rights, which stifle creativity and "the world economy depends on maximizing the economic value of creative products and culture to fuel global growth and prosperity" (86). In Pinter's opinion, new business models - not only focusing on conventional economic models - require new legal environments (88). From Toynbee's point of view the "current intellectual property regime tends to inhibit creativity and reduce public access to culture" (Isar and Anheier, 2009: 86). He argues that the regime of copyrights denies innovation and creativity (90). Referring to Boldrin and Levine the author continues, that "absent copyright, coming first to market provides a sufficient advantage to enable creators, recoup their costs" and networked distribution questions the need of distributor's monopolistic position in the cultural market (90-91). In Toynbee's opinion creativity "is essentially to select, combine and re-frame not only themes and ideas, but also concrete bits of 'cultural fabric' [… and] creators can have no legitimate claim to control the product of 'their' labour once it is done" (91). As the author concludes, copyrights are to maintain a form of monopoly. In his opinion "creativity is best considered as a kind of social authorship, one which drives a low IP

73

regime". Finally he argues, that 'piracy' not only can "exist alongside a flourishing creative sector, but that it may also bring the benefits of access and affordability to many" (96).

What these critiques seem to make clear is that recent regulation eliminates free creativity and remix, and moreover serves the aims of oligopolies. There is a clear need to rethink regulation in order to sustain a participatory cultural sphere.

3. Oligopolistic Competition

As we have previously argued, there are two main problems with the current cultural sphere: the hegemony of a certain value regime and the power of economic oligopolies in relation to the copyright regime. These problems are the results both of legislative and institutional failures, which preclude real participation and competition. The underlying core problem is that the cultural market is oligopolistic. If there would be a way to make the market more and more 'perfectly competitive' then most of the weaknesses could be solved.

There are valid critiques of the cultural industry, but the problems criticized can be attributed to the fact that the market is not competitive rather than to 'wrong' decision making and evaluation processes of the customers. The most important result of the obvious weaknesses is the emergence of hegemonic actors in the cultural industry, which have the dangerous power to govern taste, consumption and identity.

III. REDEFINING PUBLIC INTEREST

This section is dedicated to redefining public interest and to describing the ideal conditions of the cultural sphere by combining the concepts of free culture, cultural democracy and participatory culture in a cosmopolitan and democratic context. These concepts originate in different theoretical backgrounds, but their results overlap. The argument for cultural democracy can be understood as a critique of top-down canonization of cultural content. The concept of free culture emerges from the conflict between mechanical reproduction of cultural content and copyright laws. Participatory culture is a recognition of the very nature of culture. Some of the issues have been illustrated by the impacts of digital media and networked communications, but the critical arguments can and need to be applied to the *whole* cultural sphere, which indicates the complex rethinking of public interest in a cultural context.

It though this may seem idealistic, the purpose of this chapter is to present goals, which might possibly never be achieved, but could function as a guideline for further work. There is always a clear need to define goals in order to find the right means. As Daniel Drache and Marc D. Froese argue, there are "new narratives in privileged spaces about identity, diversity, distraction and transnationality [… and] norms of cultural exchange include diversity, accessibility and exclusive rights over creative output" appears (Isar and Anheier, 2010: 54). As they continue according to Tomlinson, "[c]ulture is central to social relations and building cohesive societies because it intersects with closely held social values, public perceptions and popular sovereignty" (55). Eric von Hippel's book, *Democratizing Innovation* presents a case for grater public participation in innovation management. He argues that "[u]sers' abilities to develop

high-quality new products and services for themselves are improving radically and rapidly" (121). As the author states,

> [d]emocratization of the opportunity to create is important [… and] the joy and the learning associated with creativity and membership in creative communities are also important, and these experiences too are made more widely available as innovation is democratized (123-124).

This approach can easily be adopted in cultural production.

1. Cultural Democracy and Participatory Culture

The overlapping concepts of participatory and democratic culture result in a more open, balanced and inclusive cultural sphere and a better understanding of culture. According to Borrup, cultural democracy "describes practices in which culture and artistic expression are generated, interpreted, controlled and exchanged on an equitable basis by individuals and communities rather than by institutions of central power" (2003: 1). As Borrup quotes Graves,

> for a new standard that insists upon grassroots participation, "not simply in program activities, but in the shaping of what those activities can be. Not only the products, but also the culture-production process requires democratization," and there is a clear need "to create a new process seating the community at the institutional table of public culture, in a primary decision-making role" (4).

Mirroring terms we have used here Borrup argues for cultural democracy. As Bolz quotes Smiers, this means that

> everyone has the right to have access to means of communication and the right to participate in the cultural life [… and] any form of dominance of cultural market by which it is more difficult for you to enter the cultural field is problematic [… s]o maybe we should think again about regulating the cultural market in favour of cultural diversity (Voesgen, 2005: 55).

As Balkin argues, democratic culture is a system where "individuals have a fair

opportunity to participate in the forms of meaning making […] and] each individual's ability to participate in the production and distribution of culture" (2004: 3). He also concerns that individuals should be able to participate, express their opinion, criticize and create something new (4). In his opinion freedom of speech includes popular culture, as a valuable form of cultural participation (32). According to Balkin, speech is innovation, creativity, participation and self-formation; cultural democracy is self-governance (32-33). He points out that

> [a] democratic culture is the culture of a democratized society; a democratic culture is a participatory culture. [… It] is valuable because it gives ordinary people a fair opportunity to participate in the creation and evolution of the processes of meaning-making that shape them and become part of them (33).

This is also the way to create and to form the self (37). The author continues as regards to mass culture that

> [i]n an age of unidirectional mass media, popular culture was, to a very large extent, mass culture — a set of commodities manufactured and sent out to be consumed by a mass audience (38). […] Democratic culture is not the same thing as mass culture. It makes use of the instrumentalities of mass culture, but transforms them, individualizes them (43).

This is a very important point, because Balkin attacks the hegemonic actors of the cultural industry and defends bottom-up culture. The distinction between the two is central when dealing with all critiques of mass consumption, because hegemony governed mass taste does not represent the taste of each individual. In Balkin's opinion there is a clear need to advocate new policies (47), e.g. to promote popular participation in technologies of communication under a non-censored and decentralized control (49). According to Benkler, "participation in cultural discourse is intimately tied to individual self-expression [...so t]o regulate culture is to regulate our very comprehension of the world we occupy" (298).

John Holden critiques the hegemonic aesthetic value regime and asks for an open debate in order to evaluate and represent culture in a democratic manner (2008). He questions the exclusive elitist notion of culture (10). He poses the hypothetical question: "How can culture be anything other than democratic if it is defined as the sum total of everything that people do" (10)? Holden separates "three, deeply interrelated, spheres of culture: publicly funded culture, commercial culture and home-made culture". The author claims that public funded culture is not defined by a concept, but that "what gets funded becomes culture", which drives to the over-representation of certain value regimes. Referring to commercial culture, he argues that "[s]uccess or failure is market driven, but access to the market [...] is controlled by a commercial mandarin class" (11). In the case of home-made culture he argues that

> it is defined by an informal self-selecting peer group, and the barriers to entry are much lower [… and] the decision about the quality of what is produced then lies in the hands of those who see, hear or taste the finished article (11).

He also holds that

> [t]here is no reason why 'excellence' should imply a backward-looking culture and, equally, there is no reason why 'excellence' should be conflated with exclusivity, [...] 'excellence' and 'quality' can be used as a cover for maintaining social superiority (14).

Holden argues against the understanding of art as something 'special', it "should not place [… it] 'off limits' to anyone" (14). In his understanding there are more and more "people who think that art is 'for an elite', and will try to maintain their power to define what art is by separating it from everyday life" (16). As he points out, "the cultural gatekeepers of the avant-garde go so far as to define art in terms of exclusivity" (18). This point can be connected to the unsuccessful claims of the neo avant-garde movements referred to earlier. Holden continues that in

> Bourdieu's theories of cultural capital there are well-established models showing how processes of exclusion work (19). [… A]nything that is comprehensible by the mass is by definition excluded from the avant-garde. In order to maintain its own self-worth and status, the avant-garde must [...] alienate the public (20).

In his opinion, cultural snobs and avant-garde artists, who are 'cultural exclusivists', represent one understanding of the 'truth' (20). This point is also crucial for the critiques of neo avant-garde movements and the notion of universality. As Holden points out, "in culture walls are built to defend the order of the canon, the discipline of practice, and the legitimacy of tradition against the disorder of popular culture and the threat of relativism" (21). He also argues that

> '[i]n culture, we will have to stop thinking of a dispute between high and popular culture, and enter into public debate about cultural quality [… to empower] self-governing, enlightened citizenry, with the capacity to make judgements and decide questions (23).

This is a crucial self-critiquing recognition of the elite. As Holden quotes Zuboff, "the new individuals seek true voice, direct participation, unmediated influence and identity-based community because they are comfortable using their own experience as the basis for making judgements".

In Holden's description, cultural democracy is not different from political democracy, and "it would ideally display characteristics of universalism, pluralism, equality, transparency and freedom" (25) through representative institutions. According to UN treaties and UK policies Holden argues that "the legal basis of cultural democracy already exists", only its realization has not succeeded (25). This requires education

> and animation of cultural infrastructure, events and participation. […] The goals would be for everyone to have physical, intellectual and social access to cultural life, and to have the ability and confidence to take part in and fashion the culture of today (26).

Holden also criticizes most cultural organizations because of their non-representative, self-perpetuating management (26). He points out that there is a clear need to publicly make decisions about the allocation of cultural funding and about the definition of general guidelines (26-27). He asks for "full public disclosure of artistic policies and financial information, clear criteria for funding decisions which does not exclude the possibility of expert judgement" (27), which would make the cultural sphere more transparent. To promote plurality and diversity, there is a clear need for

> closer collaboration between publicly funded and commercial subsectors to improve transition of work to larger and wider audiences (28). [...I]n a free society, no one should be obliged to enjoy the arts and culture, […] [p]eople should have an equal capacity to make choices (29).

According to Holden "the role of the expert should be that of public educator and public servant. Experts should see themselves 'as an agency of public education not of populist manipulation" (31). The author argues, that "[c]ulture should be something that we all own and make, not something that is 'given', 'offered' or 'delivered' by one section of 'us' to another" (32), and should be based on the debate of informed citizens. He concludes that "[d]emocratic culture is not an unattainable high ideal, […] it is something that should be an essential part of a wider political democracy" (34). As Holden and Jones argue, "[t]he increased value attached to cultural experience has led to more systematic and determined cultural participation" (2006: 28).

Chaney makes a similar argument when he says that "policy-makers should be concentrating on ways in which they can facilitate citizens deciding for themselves what is to count as culture and how it is to help them decide who they are" (2002: 170). This statement is central for the freedom of identity. This could be enabled through the freedom of choice, as Giddens also advocated. The same concept appears in the work of

Early as he points out, that "[a] new global citizen-based cultural democracy movement can make it" possible (2000: 6). These points show the deep relation between cosmopolitan and cultural democracy.

Arlene Goldbard's approach to cultural democracy is more connected with community development. In her opinion there is a clear need "to bring community arts and cultural activism into the public policy arena as potent ways to embody full, multidimensional citizenship and stimulate the participation" (2009: 1). The author's most important points are that

> [m]arketplace culture, dominated by the commercial cultural
> industries, is skewed in ways that counter democratic cultural
> values; the public interest can bring balance [… and c]ommunity
> cultural development projects bring people into dialogue about
> the assets and problems they hold in common (3).

She argues against the accentuated recognition of artists in the formation of cultural values (4), but she understands their job is essential in order to connect "minds into the stuff of culture, attempting to see without filters or blinders, sharing the news with anyone who is ready to receive it" (4).

1.1. What Needs to Be Done

This section presents different arguments ways to attain participatory culture and public democracy.

Holden reminds us that there is a need to provide advice to organizations, to stimulate innovation, to "promote knowledge transfer between the publicly funded cultural sector, academia and the private sector, promote the use of social software that involves more user-generated content" (2007b: 62-63). As the author writes, public institutions should create value by

> enhancing the public realm, and providing a context for
> sociability and the enjoyment of shared experiences (2006b: 17-

18). "*Everyone* is now in a minority group, so we need to understand that the public has multiple identities and many voices, not just one [… and] the distinction between amateur and professional should disappear (22).

Holden adds that "[p]rofessionals need to make themselves heard in planning committees and in local education authorities" (41). According to him,

[t]he 'cultural system' has become a closed conversation between professionals and politicians, [...] rather than on achieving the self-generated purposes of the cultural organisations themselves, or on engaging the public (52).

These points can be understood as a guide for further work towards cultural democracy, deeper cooperation among professionals, also between professionals and politicians, and moreover to open the debate to the public (53). On this basis, professionals would be able to serve public interest, which would legitimate their work in a democratic manner (54). Holden also states that public funding is an basic part of the cultural industry and provides funding for emerging talents. Subsidy enlarges the market by lowering entry barriers, and it allows institutions to function as sources of innovation and education, attracting creative businesses (2007a: 16-22). In his opinion, the creative process encompasses "the ability to frame questions and define problems; to make connections between the problem and its solutions [...and the] creative problem-solving or invention" (28).

As Holden points out, value and creativity can only be defined by the audience (26) instead of blindly accepting the decisions of determined value regimes or institutions. This implies the participatory evaluation of cultural goods.

As Kidd describes it, the framework of cultural democracy

may serve as a guide for arts managers, who often include democratic aims among their organizational goals, and offers a socio-theoretical approach to the arts that goes beyond the focus on social reproduction established by Pierre Bourdieu (2009:

> 296). [… D]emocratic culture will need to involve a deliberate movement away from traditional elite arts and toward nurturing both diversity and symbols […but t]he democratic ideal of equality cannot be achieved in the presence of elite symbols (306).

He is not arguing for any kind of censorship against exclusive high culture, but "[t]hese cultural forms can be transformed […] to function more like either inclusive social goods or exclusive group identity goods" (307). In his opinion, non-profit organizations have the chance to successfully advocate cultural democracy, but they need some public funding (307).

As Karl Lorenz remarks about public art - as a possible form of cultural democracy - artworks can "represent the collaboration and shared vision of the artist and community" (Yonder 2005: 6), which is an activity that he describes as a generator of public meaning. He opines that "[p]ublic art must commit to expanding the range of voices and meanings of place represented in the cultural mix of a given social context, and amplifying those voices within democratic notions of public space" (6). As Lisanne Gibson and John Pendlebury argue,

> [p]ultural heritage is seen as intrinsic to sustainable development, cultural diversity in the face of the threat of homogenizing globalization and a resource around which to construct dialogue, democratic debate and openness between cultures (2009: 9).

The authors emphasize that "the vigour of the debate is a sign that in addition to elitism there is also a democratic liberalism which is a central, although perhaps paradoxical, element of the heritage discourse" (14).

As Dumbleton cites Becker, artists with a critical practice are <"negotiating the public realm," often from a marginalized position, as advocates for societal self-reflection and the diverse point of view> (4). Dumbleton adds that critical art practice is

ultimately a public pursuit, which needs to find its audience (5). As she states,

> if policy and funding models ask artists to act as social agents as
> adjunct to making art, and in doing so to support the health of
> society, then policy and funding models must reciprocally value
> and support the critical perspective in art (15-16).

Borrup argues that there are a small number of institutions and organizations, which would work toward the aims of "cultural democracy and reach outside the bounds of arts professionals and into their communities" (2003). Citing Graves, Borrup also argues that professionals "must possess enough insider knowledge from both realms to be able to make accurate and responsible decisions about the process of the event" (2003).

2. Free Culture

This section makes suggestions to solve the problems of the hegemonic copyrights regime. According to Lessig "people read what is popular; what is popular has been selected by a very democratic process of peer-generated rankings" (2004: 43). This statement recognizes that people are empowered to make their own cultural decisions in a democratic way. On the other hand the range of the possible consumable goods depends on the level of competition. As Kelty points out, to understand "how Free Software works […] certain practices of legal and cultural critique may be essential to understanding the reliable foundation of knowledge production and circulation" (2008: 310). As Stallmann argues, in relation to Lessig,

> free software is a new mechanism for democracy to operate. […
> T]he code that just about everybody uses for all intents and
> purposes is writing the laws that run people's lives. With free
> software, these laws get written in a democratic way. Not the
> classical form of democracy – we don't have a big election and
> say, "Everybody vote which way should this feature be done"
> (2002: 178).

By citing Stallman Lessig argues for "free culture" — not "free" as in "free beer", "free" as in "free speech," "free markets" or "free trade" which protects creators and innovators (xiv). As he puts it, "free culture is not a culture without property, just as a free market is not a market in which everything is free" (xiv). It is crucial to understand that the concept of free culture does not oppose the market of cultural goods for "[f]ree cultures, like free markets, are built with property. But the nature of the property that builds a free culture is very different from the extremist vision that dominates the debate today" (173). Lessig summarizes the concept of free culture as the balance between anarchy and control. He states that

> [i]t is filled with rules of property and contract that get enforced by the state. But just as a free market is perverted if its property becomes feudal, so too can a free culture be queered by extremism in the property rights that define it (2004: xvi).

Lessig also argues that the hegemonic ownership of technology and the unnecessary property law are the enemies of free culture (2004: 8-12). In his view, "[f]ree cultures are cultures that leave a great deal open for others to build upon; unfree, or permission, cultures leave much less" (2004: 30). The author points out that "[a]s every free market does, this free market of free culture would grow as the consumers and producers chose" (2004: 94). Lessig argues about the impact of the widely accessible technology through the example of photography, that

> [t]he barrier to expression was lowered. Snobs would sneer at its "quality"; professionals would discount it as irrelevant. [...] Democratic tools gave ordinary people a way to express themselves more easily than any tools could have before (2004: 33).

In his opinion of the online environment, which is the closest realization of free culture, "[p]eople read what is popular; what is popular has been selected by a very democratic process of peer-generated rankings" (2004: 43). "We live in a "cut and paste" culture

enabled by technology" (2004: 105) and, as he later argues, "[a] society that defends the ideals of free culture must preserve precisely the opportunity for new creativity to threaten the old" (2004: 119). Lessig advocates a middle-way solution between "All Rights Reserved" and "No Rights Reserved" extreme approaches to copyright (2004: 276). In his opinion, Creative Commons licences are solutions for <the person associated with the license believes in something different than the "All" or "No" extremes> (2004: 283). Lessig's argument not only shows the importance copyright reform, but also fits into the arguments we have made in favour of cultural democracy.

Regarding intellectual property rights, Balkin argues that "media companies have generally resisted the idea that freedom of speech limits the expansion of intellectual property rights" and have limited telecommunications (2004: 17). According to him "[intellectual p]roperty is becoming the right of the information industries to control how ordinary people use digital content" (25-26).

The *Charter for Innovation, Creativity and Access to Knowledge 2.0.1* shows the common basis of a wide scale of advocacy, organizations. This agreement is the latest in this field of advocacy and as such, represents well the most recent needs. As the introduction writes,

> citizens, artists and consumers are no longer powerless and isolated in the face of the content production and distribution industries: now individuals across many different spheres collaborate, participate and decide in a direct and democratic way.

As the *Charter* continues,

> the entertainment industry […] is being imposed as the only possible model to market culture. This leads to restrictions on citizens' rights to education, access to information, culture, science and technology; Freedom of expression.

This demonstrates the argument for a more participative and bottom-up culture, where

the conditions are not governed by oligopolies. As the document argues, "[t]he conservative and defensive behaviour of the copyright production and distribution industries has led to a situation where authors and their audiences are pitted against each other". In the next section the document argues about access to knowledge: "[c]ulture evolves as knowledge spreads throughout society. We understand education as a social process that involves a wide range of educational actors, technologies, entities and activities". The further sections of the *Charter* make claims for structural requirements and the transparency of the cultural sphere.

We have thus summarized the principal arguments regarding the relations between culture and intellectual property rights. This approach focuses on the online environment but the statements can be adapted to the cultural sphere in general. In short, there is a clear need for the wide usage of such licences, which allow everyone to share, copy and remix in order to foster the participatory nature of culture.

3. Summary: The Ideal Conditions

As we have seen, the concepts of free culture, cultural democracy and participatory culture together describe the ideal cultural sphere in the light of public interest. It is in the interest of the public to have a perfectly competitive and participatory cultural sphere. This also requires a balanced representation of the different systems of habitus, taste and value regimes, freedom of expression and cultural diversity. In order to reach these ideal conditions changes are needed in both institutional practice and legislation. Although these are idealized, never perfectly reachable conditions, it is important to note that the weaknesses all result from the lack of perfect competition. Authenticity and originality are used to prove value, which makes something sellable in the traditional high cultural market; these notions also used to demarcate high from popular culture. In

the ideal conditions of cultural democracy, citizens would be free from any kind of taste governance and the competitive market would serve diverse goods.

It is therefore necessary to rethink questions of regulation, content and evaluation. Access should be total, while creation and recognition should participatory and democratic.

IV. REACHING THE IDEAL CONDITIONS

In this chapter – which can be considered as the core of the present thesis – explores how role of each actor should be rethought. It can be understood as a manifesto for all the actors, who subscribe to the values of free, participatory and democratic culture. The different arguments made should be heeded in the practice of public actors – institutions, regulation and subsidy – but should be understood more as suggestions for creators themselves.

1. Evaluation as an Open Debate

As argued earlier, none of the value regimes can represent universal values. This indicates the clear need to allow open evaluation of cultural goods in order to eliminate hierarchy and the over-representation of some tastes and regimes of habitus and the monopoly of certain theories in the cultural sphere. As there are many different regimes of habitus and personal tastes, there needs to be multiple and parallel value regimes. The freedom of value regimes indicates cultural diversity, yet cultural diversity cannot be sustained or achieved with only one, hegemonic value regime. Public debate about cultural goods does not mean the creation of one common, hegemonic value regime, but the existence of parallel ones. This open debate can be understood as form of collaborative decision making, which evaluates cultural goods. Instead of the hegemony of the majority – even if one could be defined in an open way – must occur the balanced representation of the different regimes. On the other hand, and in general, the collective evaluation of cultural content gives the most relevant result. This "wisdom of crowds" is the representation of direct democracy in the evaluation of cultural goods. Open debate would do away with the questionable notions of universality, authenticity and

originality. This is crucial as universality and diversity are antagonistic and the notion of authenticity and originality should have no relation to value. Instead of the hegemony of these imagined values other values could be recognized. It is also important that open debate should be able to continuously re-evaluate so as not to be stuck in a certain value regime. The recently widely accepted value regimes should not be seen as the best and only, but as a temporary one.

An open debate by empowered individual citizens would mean active participation that favours bottom-up nature cultural expression. It would thus blur the boundaries between high and popular culture, and could re-frame the notion of artists and amateur. Moreover, value can be defined together by creators and receivers. This basis would theoretically enable everyone to act as a creator and to be evaluated by the widest possible community. The boundary blurring does not mean, however that the community would not be able to recognize the value of cultural content. Rather, it means that the value of cultural content is not determined, but evaluated in an open debate. There will be always creators whose works are much more recognized by the public, but will occur independently of pre-established value regimes. There will be professionals and amateurs, defined not by hegemonic value regimes but instead as through an open decision making process.

A perfectly competitive cultural market is able to represent such open debate. The perfectly competitive market and the public interest have the same nature.

2. Rethinking Cultural Funding

The cultural market is not perfectly competitive however thus it is in the public interest to balance the market through public intervention and subsidies. Yet public subsidy should be used only for non-marketable cultural products instead of for the

over-representation of certain value regimes and regimes of habitus, as is the case with high culture.

As regards the financing of cultural providers, there are three main types of cases. The clearest case is that of marketable content than can be financed through its sale, without the need for any other source of funding. Another mode would be semi-market one, where the project is recognized and funded by a relevant community. This means that the project cannot be sustained from sales but there is a community to fund it. The final case is when there is a clear need for public subsidy.

If a project cannot be funded on the competitive market and there is a need for community or public funding, than it needs to be non-profit. The non-profit nature allows creators to make their living from their projects. When the creator works for his or her own pleasure and does not require income for the realization of the project, this is what Holden calls home made art and is also described by Lessig as part of the hybrid nature of the cultural market.

In the following section I summarize a coherent pattern for cultural finance. Each level represents a form of funding. If the product can be funded with one of the basic models, there is no need to use other sources such as public subsidy.

2.1. Investing

Marketable products can be funded from investments, which means a revenue sharing model with the investor. In the economists 'ideal world' every cultural product would find its own market and can be funded by investments.

2.2. Sponsorship and Advertisement

Another fully market-oriented funding pattern is to provide a platform for advertising, using the renome to finance cultural product.

2.3. Crowdfunding

If the product cannot be funded in the traditional market, but there exists a community of consumers who can finance the project for their own interest and pleasure, then production can be sustained in a non-profit manner.

3. Offline Specificities

The fact that the cultural market cannot be perfectly competitive makes it necessary to impose the intervention of the state in order to support diversity, access and participation as public good.

3.1. Role of the State

As most state systems subsidize high culture, three points need to be made. First, that any cultural production project that does not find an audience, should no longer be subsidized. Second, if a product could be marketable – even at a higher price – should not be directly subsidized. Third, public subsidy should not be used if it results in the over-representation of certain value regimes.

As the market is not perfectly competitive, the central role of the state, – via both its institutional and funding system, – is to keep the cultural sphere diverse and accessible; it also needs to fill gaps in cultural supply, without representing a specific value regime, or becoming stuck in one interpretation of cultural value. It is not the responsibility of the state to demarcate between value and non-value. This means that the state needs to push the cultural sphere towards perfectly competitive conditions. Moreover access requires the support of cultural translation and at certain points public subsidy. Publicly funded culture should be both the locus and an indicator of public debate and self-reflection, and it is therefore the obligation of public institutions to frame such activities and promote them.

Culture should not act for political interest, but this does not mean that it should not be reflective. The political community should not be formed by cultural politics, but individuals and communities should form their own cultural identity in a cosmopolitan spirit, and should be able to continuously re-evaluate their heritage, memory and history in an open debate. Cultural democracy and freedom of expression are in an antagonistic relationship with cultural politics as they are usually practised.

If the ideal conditions – especially perfect competition – could be completely realized, there would be no need for cultural politics. As these ideal conditions in the offline cultural sphere cannot be achieved, the offline cultural sphere needs to be 'digitalized' to the extent possible. By this I mean the shift towards digital and online creation, sharing and consumption of all possibly available cultural goods. Digitalization – if it cannot be financed from the market – should be subsidized.

Cultural awareness is in the public interest and can be achieved by cultural translation between the different regimes of habitus and personal value regimes. This means physical, economic and intellectual access to all kinds of cultural content.

3.2. Subsidy

If none of the above patterns are effective, then the following forms of public invention and subsidy might be envisaged.

3.2.1. Democratically Distributed Public Funding

If the product is not marketable as possible consumers are not financially capable of finding it, yet have an interest in it, then they should be involved in decision regarding public cultural subsidy.

3.2.2. Balancing Public Funding

If none of the previously discussed patterns work for a project, then there is neither market nor interest for it. As it is in the public interest to make the cultural sphere diverse and perfectly competitive, it is important to lower entry barrier and allow new projects to be designed and new approaches to be elaborated. If content or an approach appears in a competitive market than it can be and will be evaluated accordingly.

Cooperation between the public, non-profit and for-profit sectors is in many cases necessary, but a marketable product should not get public subsidy and publicly funded projects should not be profit-oriented.

3.2.3. Institutional System

The public institutional system plays an important role in making different cultural content accessible, providing cultural translation, supporting diversity and lowering barrier to entry. Cultural institutions should indicate and frame public debate instead of representing high cultural taste as the only value. Identity formation should be free from public institutional pressure. Instead of representing the value regime of a certain elite, these institutions need to be the most important offline tools of cultural translation and the sphere of public debate about culture. It is important to provide access to products, that are inaccessible economically, physically or intellectually, but this should be a value-free representation of all the different value regimes in the spirit of cultural translation.

This cultural translation does not only means the translation of a specific value regime into other ones, for the process of translation needs to be a multipath process. It does not serve the public interest to push citizens toward a certain value regime, for they should be able to freely form their own cultural identity. Moreover in order to represent

a wide variety of content and to lower the barriers of entry to the cultural market, these institutions need to be spaces of active participation. In our context, not only public museums, exhibition spaces, theatres and concert halls, but also state owned TV and radio channels can be viewed as public cultural institutions, working along the same guidelines and towards the same goals.

As public spaces could be more appropriate for open debate and cultural translation, these institutions and public service providers need to act independently of their buildings and use public space to make the biggest impact possible. There is a clear need to rethink the usage of public spaces for cultural purpose. As Witcomb argues by referring to Chakrabarty "museums, in their recognition of the importance of experiential forms of knowledge are ideally positioned to participate in what he calls an "experiential" form of democracy" (Cameron, 45). She also argues for the wide usage of multimedia tools in museums "to explicitly explore the possibilities of affective responses for the production of cultural narratives which seek to work across cultural divides." (46). Indeed, participative digital technology has great political impact on museological representation. Russo and Watkins argue that the usage of digital technology in museum spaces provides to the visitor control and choice and also allows creative participation; this is a

> method of audience interaction and community value sharing. The resulting artifacts produce new types of cultural experiences where the audience as both the reader and the producer, and plays an active role in the remediation of knowledge (Cameron, 161).

Russo and Watkins argue for the interaction of audience and institution. A new

> literacy must privilege audiences in the construction of meaning and address the changing status of audiences in their interaction with the museum as an institution, [..., which] provides a conceptualization for how audiences can "make meaning" and

through the institution in order to create new networks of shared
creation distribution (162).

Mason goes further by referring to 'open infrastructure' arguments that she connects to issues in museums. As she points out,

> [a]s long as cultural information professionals, in the developed world particularly, understand their role as social interpreters and cultural brokers in this pioneering and mapping exercise, there is an opportunity for wider cultural congress (235).

According to George F. MacDonald and Alsford "[m]useums have an important role to play in the production and management of information" (Parry, 78)". Arvanitis also argues for a similar aim: the use of mobile phone technology to spread information outside the walls of the museums (Parry, 174).

> The concept of 'post-museum' provides the necessary theoretical basis from a museological point of view, while the everyday nature of popular mobile devices, such as camera phones, can put theory into practice. [… M]useums might be able to access the fabric of daily existence that makes people who they are, how they see and understand the world around them (Parry, 175).

Digital technology makes it possible to involve visitors in the evaluation and creation of cultural goods. There is less and less need to run an institution within the confines of a building; instead creating an online platform – allowing copy and remix of the content – to base a participative forum, to debate issues, makes possible a free forging of self-identities, the representation of different identities and sorts of habitus. The institution would support freedom of choice and of identity formation.

3.2.4. Education

Public cultural institutions can be described as the infrastructure of cultural translation and public education. They provide capacities and knowledge, citizens require in order to participate in the open, public debate of cultural evaluation and in

general in cultural production and the capacity to form identities more freely. This understanding of public cultural education is the opposite of the widely accepted model, which selects learning material and the representation of goods according to a certain value regime. Education needs to enable citizens to have a broad overview of the different value regimes through which they may freely form their identity. This awareness requires cultural translation as a method of education by using the students' different cultural values as reference points instead of devaluing and criticizing them. Higher education in the cultural sphere is even more problematic and needs deep reform – by keeping a close eye on the positive and negative trends of Beuys – in order to represent the values of free, participatory and democratic culture.

3.2.5. Intellectual Property Rights

As the argument of free culture stated, there is a clear need to rethink intellectual property rights, especially copyright in order to foster the participatory nature of culture, to enable the copying, sharing and remixing of cultural goods, especially in the case of digital, online environments.

Everything owned or subsidized by the public – including institutions – should be shared under licences that allow physical access, as well as copying, sharing and remixing of the works. This also means that all creators and projects that use public funding must use open licences.

3.3. Creators

We have constantly argued for the freedom of creators, including artists and curators. It is important to state that no regulation of creators is suggested. On the contrary, it is necessary to regulate the usage of public funding by subsidizing non-marketable and non-profit that stand outside the copyright regime. Therefore, the arguments made here

are only suggestion, a possible manifesto or template for artists and curators – as defined in the introduction – who care about public interest, are socially engaged and would like to make progress towards a more open, participatory, free and democratic cultural sphere.

Creators need to be aware that the forms and codes used are defined by certain section of the population. The choice of forms should be consciously targeted by creators themselves. This means that creations meant for the high cultural sphere are completely legitimate, but the creator should be aware of the exclusive nature of his or her own practice. There is a possibility that some forms and codes will lead to social and cultural exclusion. The problem of exclusion can be partly avoided by motivating participation in the creation. This sort of creation can be understood as the motivation for others to create.

Access to the work, in not only intellectual but also physical terms needs to be made possible in space that allows the widest possible interface. Such spaces are less likely to be the public and private cultural institutions, and more likely to be public spaces. The forms, codes and spaces used are important, but equally so is the selection of the theme. Moreover, creators should understand the argument of free culture is not to act as monopolies of the cultural market.

Creation can be understood as an analysis of the social structure and reflection on social issues instead of debates about forms and value regimes. To successfully achieve this aim and to have a social impact the creation needs to be in deep relation with disciplines of social sciences.

4. The Digital and Networked Era

4.1. Promises

Networked communication tools, like the Internet, other web and mobile phone systems make it easier than ever ever to increase the power of collective, participative creation, decision making and valuing. While the potential of cultural democratization and cultural democracy has significantly increased also through the availability of the web and digital media, there remains room for improvement. The web environment could realize of the ideal conditions of the cultural sphere, as it has a participatory and remix nature and extremely low entry barriers which makes the digital sphere highly competitive.

Leading IT companies define themselves with a computing profile, but they are influential actors of the cultural sphere. By promoting services, however, they can easily be censors of cultural creation. These companies offer free server space to share content, tools to create content. This tendency supports cultural democracy, but companies can manage the process in an undemocratic way if it would serve their interest. For example, the rankings of search engines form the contemporary canon. These algorithms are partly based on the users' opinion, but as they are not open source the exact methodology by which they are derived is not public. This poses serious questions about their reliability and impact. Because search engines and other services are the frames of the online cultural sphere, they also should be analysed in their cultural aspects. There is a clear need to regulate them in an intergovernmental way to support the ideas of cultural democracy and democratization. In Balkin's opinion

> the paradigm case that motivates the progressivist agenda — the case of few speakers broadcasting to a largely inactive mass audience — no longer describes the world (31). [...] Internet speech is a social activity, a matter of interactivity, of give and

take, it is not surprising that Internet speech creates new communities, cultures and subcultures (32).

In other words, for him the Internet fosters a truly popular and individualized culture (38). As Benkler similarly argues,

> [a]s economic policy, allowing yesterday's winners to dictate the terms of tomorrow's economic competition would be disastrous. As social policy, missing an opportunity to enrich democracy, freedom, and justice in our society while maintaining or even enhancing our productivity would be unforgivable (quoted by Pinter; Isar, 2008: 89).

According to Benkler the Internet

> adds to the centralized, market-oriented production system a new framework [..., which] affects the ability of individuals and groups to participate in the production of the [more transparent] cultural tools and frameworks [which is the] emergence of a new popular culture, produced on the folk-culture model and inhabited actively, rather than passively consumed by the masses (2006: 275),

and this participation makes individuals more sophisticated. As the author continues, "[f]rom the perspective of liberal political theory, the kind of open, participatory, transparent folk culture […] is normatively more attractive than was the industrial cultural production" (277). Moreover, there is a clear need "to allow meaning making in culture to play a role in the core concerns of liberal political theory [and t]he question of how culture is framed [...] becomes germane to a liberal political theory" (283-4). As Benkler points out, the online possibilities of an alternative cultural sphere "makes culture substantially more transparent and available for reflection" (2006: 293). In his view "[t]he result is, as we are already seeing it, the emergence of widely accessible, self-conscious conversation about the meaning of contemporary culture by those who inhabit it" (295). Previously existing folk culture was displaced by commercially produced mass popular culture and reduced individuals from "coproducers and

replicators to passive consumers" (296).

Lessig's argument about the democratization of photography is adaptable in order to understand the impact of digital technology on the cultural sphere in general. As the author states,

> [t]he barrier to expression was lowered. Snobs would sneer at its "quality"; professionals would discount it as irrelevant. [...] Democratic tools gave ordinary people a way to express themselves more easily than any tools could have before (33).

As Holden also argues, the web has a huge effect "across a broad range of traditionally defined areas such as arts, education and trade, and in new areas of enquiry such as skills development, networking, public space within cities, and the protocols of the internet" (2007a 1). He claiming that "there will be an increasing need for cultural organisations to invest in technology, and in the capacity to use it effectively" (2007b 58). Here the author refers to the possibilities of technology motivated and influenced creativity and innovation. He proposes collaborative projects to encourage new users, innovation, online booking and ticket and publication sales and digitization. Holden also argues for the inventions of "new forms of technology, especially in highlighting non-market or emerging market fields" (2007b 59). As McGuigan wrote back in the mid-nineties,

> [I was] less optimistic about the magical power of computer-mediated communications but I do believe every opportunity to communicate our hopes and plans should be seized if we want a more democratic culture and policy (1996 4).

The changes effected by the web need to be understood in the context of the entire contemporary cultural sphere. While not everyone has access to the Internet, the possibility of becoming a user is more and more easily attainable. The quantity of accessible content has dramatically increased and 'netizens' (Benkler, 78) are influential

through their ability to share and rank content, which reduces the power of previously hegemonic discourses of value. For 'netizens', the web becomes the basic environment of the cultural sphere, and they themselves play the pivotal role in the creation and recognition of content. Users are able to create content with digital devices and are able to share it on user-friendly and free web 2.0 sites. These services offer free content sharing in return for advertising and database analysis revenues. This was an important step towards the open usage of the Internet. With user-generated content becoming more influential, citizens with Internet connection have more cultural capital than ever before and emerge as powerful actors in the cultural sphere. However, this cultural sphere and its actors are also not independent from the influence of elites, mass media and economical interest.

4.2. Requirements

First, access to the Internet needs to be subsidized. Subsequently, as the previously cited argued, there is a clear need to sustain the legislative framework by rethinking copyright regimes. To preserve the Internet's participatory and remix nature the infrastructure needs to stay decentralized, network has to be neutral and free from any kinds of censorship. Furthermore, as will be discussed, digital creation has to be made economically sustainable. Currently it lacks a stable revenue model. As the digital environment offers the best possibilities to attain the ideal conditions of the cultural sphere, it is in the public interest to break away from material culture and 'digitalize' as much as possible. This process would include tools and services which allow and motivate participatory culture.

5. Possible Consequences

At this point we should also consider how the democratic environment will affect the future development of the cultural sphere. Under ideal conditions all kinds of cultural goods would appear on the market. Moreover, everyone could participate as creator, and everyone would be free to choose what to consume. This model of consumption would the opposite of the high cultural or economic monopolies' governed top-down model. Under these ideal conditions, expression would be free and the cultural sphere would be highly diverse. Individuals would enable to choose and form their cultural identity. There are two reasons why this public debate and evaluation of cultural goods would not end up in anarchy: every individual is able to recognize values – according to her or his habitus – and everyone is able to recognize the knowledge of a 'professional'. The research does not argue that everyone would have the same qualities, but everyone should have the chance to be evaluated and to evaluate, as value can only be recognized in an open debate. Cultural democracy would produce a more balanced cultural sphere.

Cosmopolitan democracy can be realized through cultural democracy on an individual plane. This would increase freedom of choice and decrease power of the group governed identities, like the notion of nation-based community. Such freedom of choice would enable individuals to adopt a multiple, complex identity, and belong to a wide variety of communities. It would be a 'soft' way to slowly decrease the grip of the notion of nation. Furthermore, cultural democracy would allow indigenous and minority citizens to keep their own cultural identity. It also encompasses the concept of cultural relativism, and can 'humanize' globalization because its basis would no longer be the hegemonic and oligopolistic pressure of key players, but the choice of the individual. Cultural democracy provides new ways for communities to be built in a participatory

manner. Cultural democracy also offers a possibility to balance the representation of hegemonic and sub-cultures.

Cultural democracy would have a negative impact on existing oligopolies in the cultural market, but would not deny opportunities to a wide scale of profitable businesses. It does not eliminates the market-based culture, only requires a new, more inclusive business model. The impact of mass produced, marketable cultural goods would decrease under the idealized conditions of cultural democracy, because a wider range of goods would appear on the market.

V. CONCLUSION

We have advocated a holistic concept of the cultural sphere by combining theories of participatory culture, cultural democracy and free culture in the framework of cosmopolitan democracy, in order to redefine public interest.

The first chapter contextualized the argument.

The second chapter sought to demonstrate that the very nature of culture is participatory and democratic. Any other understanding would not serve public purpose and would be exclusionary. The argument had recourse to the ideas of Adorno and Bourdieu, the practice of Beuys and the exhibitions of major French cultural institutions. It also touched the role of copyright and monopolistic competition in the cultural sphere. Every individual has his or her own taste, which means an endless variety of parallel cultural value regimes, which is diversity by definition. This logically means that there is no universal way to evaluate any kind of cultural content, so high culture has no grates legitimacy than any other forms. Culture cannot be understood as some other fields of science, where an academic methodology can classify the findings. Instead, we need to recognize that culture is based on remix. Creativity can be understood through the lenses of different value regimes; for this reason, cultural expression and identity need to be free. Individuals have the capacity to evaluate, if they are given a wide variety of options from which to choose and are able to create. Many individuals together may constitute a 'mass', but the problem with mass culture is not the habitus of the individuals, but the hegemonic and oligopolistic nature of the cultural industry. Individual recognition of value is the way to evaluate, which means democracy and freedom in the cultural context. Our case studies have shown that public institutions

shape cultural identity and value regimes instead of supporting the freedom of individuals to choose. In order to offer the capacity to choose, the cultural sphere needs to be diverse and highly competitive.

The third chapter theoretically redefined public interest in the cultural realm by combining the concepts of free culture, cultural democracy and participatory culture. There is a clear need to advocate that anybody can act as a creator and is also free to evaluate. This correlates with the aims of democratic political regimes. Cultural participation requires a rethinking of the legislative framework of creation, distribution and remix.

The fourth chapter made suggestions for changes that are needed in order to achieve the ideal conditions of the cultural sphere, covering inter alia public institutions and funding, regulation and creators. To achieve the support of these aims, public cultural institutions should provide opportunities to the non-marketable and realize cultural translation, instead of pushing high culture, which cannot balance and diversify the cultural sphere. Legislation should support access and the remix nature of culture. Creators should be aware that their practice can be exclusionary. Digital media and networked communications offer the best possibility of attaining the ideal conditions of the cultural sphere, but the neutrality of the network and the freedom to share needs to be assured.

1. Using the Findings

The changes advocated so as to attain the ideal cultural sphere can be used as a manifesto for creators, as a guideline for policy makers and as a concept and framework for advocacy organizations. These actors latter are crucial for progress towards the realization of the ideal conditions. Our findings point to the possibility of having

cultural organizations that promote participatory, free and democratic culture.

2. On the Quest for Sustainable Online Business Models of Free, Participatory and Democratic Culture – PhD Research Proposal

2.1. Abstract

The proposed PhD research would analyze existing business and revenue models – covering financing and distribution – of the most relevant online services that partially ensure the conditions of free and participatory culture and cultural democracy. Research methods would primarily include statistical analysis and in depth interviews with service providers. Data would be gathered on monetary and information flows, visitor statistics and behaviours etc. enabling the researcher to apprehend key success factors of the studied business models. New models and practices, which could then be tested and applied in the real economic context would be proposed. The need for new business models is vital for alternative licensing regimes, such as Creative Commons.

2.2. Context

Following the general argument of this thesis it is relevant and necessary to specifically analyse the digital and online cultural sphere. By its participatory, diverse and democratic nature, the new online cultural sphere could provide the framework closest to the above mentioned ideal conditions.

The revolution of web 2.0 enables users to participate in cultural production by sharing content; however this revolution has not enabled creators to make profit or even cover costs by using alternative copyright models. The most influential online user generated services are not notable promoters of free culture, and moreover they do not typically distribute their revenue among creators and contributors. This in turn makes

the system unsustainable for creators who – by using open licenses – want to cover their cost. Recent for-profit models – such as the Amazon e-book store and the iTunes music store – are promoters of strict monitoring and top-down distribution. Meanwhile all possibilities could be given to economically sustain the participatory nature of culture and to support the aims of free culture.

2.3. Research Problematic

To develop the participatory, free and democratic nature of the online cultural sphere the following conditions need to be achieved.

1. Economic sustainability of creation

2. Legislative sustainability of free culture

3. Decentralized infrastructure

4. Net neutrality

5. Freedom from censorship

The proposed PhD research would focus on economic sustainability in deep relation with legislative sustainability in order to promote cultural democracy, participatory culture and free culture. It is not the field of this research to critique the hegemonic intellectual property right regime, but the research would use the relevant arguments as reference points. Under the current copyright regime – which does not promote participatory and democratic culture – it is possible to attain economically sustainable cultural production. However, it is very difficult to develop business models that can sustain the cultural sphere under alternative licenses, such as Creative Commons, and foster the remix nature of cultures.

To achieve the economic sustainability of the for-profit digital (remix) culture, business models need to be rethought; moreover new online models and innovative

services are needed. There is a clear need to combine existing progressive solutions – focusing on partial elements of the proposed arguments – to develop new ones that to serve the public interest.

2.4. Research Methodology

Research methods would include discourse, policy and statistical analysis, in depth interviews with service providers and project case studies. The data gathered would consist of monetary and information flows, visitor statistics and behaviour etc.

2.5. Research Questions and Case Studies

Listed below are the key research questions.

1. What economic revenue models and strategies are needed to enable economically viable free and participatory culture, cultural democracy in the digital environment by using open licenses?

2. Which are the comparable solutions and business models applied in other online contexts?

3. How to finance a project?

Investment – Growvc

Sponsorship – Vodo

Crowd-funding – KickStarter, Goteo, Indiegogo, Ulule, Chipin, Kiva

Micro donation – Flattr, Jameo

Advertisement revenue sharing model – partly YouTube and Blogger, Hulu, Vevo

Flatrate – Last.fm

4. How to implement public funding in the online framework?

Democratically distributed cultural funding – CrowdCulture

5. How to share the content under free licenses?

Creative Commons as an option – Netlabels, Flickr

Revenue sharing model – Jameo

Flat rate – Magnatune

6. How to motivate and sustain participatory and free culture?

Life in a day

Play - Guggenheim Museum

Netkomédia

Mobile Film Festival

Riot Cinema

Annecy Festival

7. How to understand marketability and value recognition in this highly competitive market?

Viewer rankings – Google's Art Project, YouTube, Jameo, Deezer

Search engine rankings – Google, Bing

Downloads at torrent trackers – The Pirate Bay, BitTorrent

Tools to evaluate – MuseTrek, ClickStarter

Connect with fans – RootMusic

8. How to implement an online service, based on the sustainable business model?

9. How to implement the findings in cultural policy making?

2.6. Results

The findings would suggest new models and practices, which could then be tested and applied in the real economic context. In parallel with the proposed research, my ultimate objective is to implement an online service, capable of providing the suitable environment for free and participatory culture, cultural democracy. The findings could

be used to rethink cultural policy.

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