7. Vigilantism or Outrage: An Exploration of Policing Social Norms through Social Media

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Introduction

The idea of cybervigilantes, or digilantes (Byrne, 2013; Chang & Poon, 2016; Huey et al, 2012; Martin, 2007; Marx, 2013), has been gaining traction, but not enough attention has been paid to the question of the legitimacy of the use of the term vigilante and what the use of the term implies in the context of digital media.

This chapter looks at the ways in which acts of online public shaming—often deemed as acts of cybervigilantism—as a reaction to the transgression of a social norm or legal rule may be granted social and ethical legitimacy through the use of the term. Its purpose is to explore the concept of vigilantism and compare it to cybervigilantism in order to better determine the legitimacy of the actors and the accuracy of the term. In connection with this analysis, the alternate and less salubrious term outrage will be explored as a way to gain a better understanding of the intentions of the presumptive vigilante. This chapter will show that technology enables levels of manipulation where certain users cultivate the outrage of others, and through this cultivation compromise the legitimacy of the outrage or vigilantism. A wide range of online acts could in one sense or another fit loosely into the description of vigilantism. It is therefore necessary to be more precise about the acts that lie at the heart of this practice. This work studies the often disproportionate social reaction to the mundane actions of a noncelebrity. It excludes reactions to celebrities’ actions since these often evoke high emotions and therefore the actions of both fans and haters may be motivated by a range of opaque reasons. Furthermore, by analyzing the reaction to a relatively mundane
act—rather than an obviously egregious one—this work aims to exclude what would generally be considered reasonable reactions to events.

Naturally, whether an act is mundane or egregious is often a matter of opinion. This chapter will define mundane acts as being within the framework of rights as supported by legislation. Therefore, readers need not support these mundane acts but should be required to tolerate those who perform them. As much as individuals may disapprove of people using selfie sticks, openly carrying weapons, or public displays of affection, to the extent where these acts are within the law, they are mundane and to be tolerated.

**Vigilantism: An Overview**

From his criminological analysis of late 20th-century vigilantism, Johnston (1996) derives a set of six necessary features for vigilantism, which will be used as a basis for the discussion of vigilantism in this work, and as a way to analyze how online vigilantism differs from its more traditional counterparts. These necessary features are (i) planning, (ii) voluntary participation, (iii) reacting to norm transgression, (iv) creating a social movement, (v) threatening or using force, and (vi) offering security. The first three features are self-explanatory. Any act of vigilantism is a planned reaction to the transgression of a social norm or legal rule, carried out voluntarily by individuals who are not legally authorized to mete out punishment. However, the latter three criteria require some further exploration.

Despite the seemingly counterintuitive comparison between social movements and vigilantism made by Johnston in his fourth feature, it is important to remember that not all social movements have morally acceptable goals or means. A social movement is a collected, conscious, and continued effort by volunteers to bring about social change (Goodwin & Jasper, 2015). The trope of the lone vigilante seems to counter this idea of vigilantism being a social movement; however, it is important to remember that vigilantism is about affecting social change, even if the vigilante acts on his own. If an act of vigilantism does not have a social purpose it is a self-serving act, and as such not legitimate vigilantism. Online vigilantism may differ from offline social movements in speed and persistence as they can form and disperse much faster than their offline counterparts. Even though the investment in time and energy to gather is negligible and the barriers to participate are low, a gathering online with a clear purpose still should be considered a social movement, albeit a temporary one.

On the question of violence in point (v), history and popular media have taught us to recognize vigilantism as the use of physical force, and this will
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need to be reconciled with the less physical actions undertaken in online environments, where threats are common but actual physical force is usually not an option. Therefore, the use of force will need to be explored further when studying online vigilantism in the sections below. The sixth feature identified by Johnston deals with offering security, and refers to vigilantism occurring when the legal and social systems fail to provide desired outcomes. In this view, vigilantism transcends the individual act and creates the groundwork for social change. Therefore, random acts of violence without the intention to reinforce social order do not constitute vigilantism.

Johnston’s (1996) six criteria for vigilantism are a great starting point for the discussion on online acts of vigilantism. His work was written on the cusp of the proliferation of the internet and focused only on offline work, begging the question if his criteria are still valid in the online context.

If the online acts of apparent vigilantism fulfill all of Johnston’s criteria, then we have no conceptual problem and online acts can easily fit into the vigilante discourse. However, if the online acts do not display the six features, we are left with a choice; (a) the online acts are not vigilantism and we are dealing with a false comparison, or (b) the acts are vigilantism, but not in the way Johnston envisioned it, and we are dealing with a development that requires an update to existing theories of vigilantism. One of the most common forms of online actions that may be understood as vigilantism is the act of naming and shaming, which therefore constitutes a good place to start in an exploration of online vigilantism.

Naming and Shaming

With or without digital technology, norms are a loosely agreed-upon consensus of what is understood as the correct behavior in a given situation. Such agreements can vary to a degree within different social units (Jackson, 1965) but in general are recognizable expressions of acceptable group conduct (Lapinski & Rimal, 2005). These expressions of behavior are closely connected to maintaining group order and social control without the need to resorting to the formal judicial system (Hackman, 1992; Tunick, 2013). Social norms are generally enforced formally through sanctions, or informally through verbal statements or nonverbal cues (Feldman, 1984), that signal the correct or incorrect behavior. Therefore, when people witness a norm transgression they can both actively and passively signal their disapproval. They can choose to verbally rebuke or to show their disapproval through body language. However, when communicating through digital media, the ability of the would-be vigilante to react is altered.
Internet-connected digital technology allows for a greater level of participation but limits the scope of this participation to communication acts, that is, the would-be vigilante cannot physically harm someone over the internet. The range of acts falls mainly into either insults and threats, or naming and shaming. All the examples in this chapter include, to a varying degree, a mixture of these two forms of activities. The goal of insult and threat is both to socially ostracize and to induce a fear that the threats will be carried out. The naming and shaming focuses on disclosing information about an identified individual so that judgment can be passed on the person’s actions.

The latter either induces a sense of shame in the victim, or indicates to the victim’s social group that he or she should be ashamed. Thus, even if the victim does not feel shame, punishment is inflicted by damaging the social status and reputation of the individual (Rowbottom, 2013). Massaro (1997) argues that there is a great deal of imprecision in the use of the concept of shaming as a social or legal punishment due to the conflation of: shame, shameful, and shaming. He argues: “…Shame is the internal reaction: shame the emotion. What is shameful is a normative judgment imposed onto behaviors, desires, or other entities. Shaming is an external action: shame the verb” (p. 672, italics in original). The feeling of shame does not require being shamed, and attempts at shaming may not produce feelings of shame. This is why naming and shaming is a normative expression of what the victim ought to feel (Massaro, 1997).

Naming and shaming have been common occurrences in mass media; Daily Mail editor Paul Dacre argues that this is, in part, the duty of mass media:

> Since time immemorial public shaming has been a vital element in defending the parameters of what are considered acceptable standards of social behaviour, helping to ensure that citizens—rich and poor—adhere to them for the good of the greater community. For hundreds of years, the press has played a role in that process. It has the freedom to identify those who have offended public standards of decency—the very standards its readers believe in—and hold the transgressors up to public condemnation. (Daily Mail editor Paul Dacre, quoted in Rowbottom, 2013, p. 7)

The internet has played a vital role in challenging the exclusive position held by mass media and opens up the ability for nontraditional players to engage in naming and shaming. Traditional mass media holds a formal and complex legal position within a society and therefore has, to a certain extent, license to name and shame. The vigilantism of the internet age is, in this case, the practice of individuals performing the naming and shaming, and they fall outside the legal framework often awarded to mass media.
outlets. The free speech rights of individuals are often not as robust as those of traditional media and their ability to participate in defamation lawsuits is significantly lower.

**Examples of Cybervigilantism**

Part of the scholarly debate on online communities has centered on the attempt to understand the source and legitimacy of rules and norms. One of the early influential contributions to this discussion is Julian Dibbell’s 1993 article “A Rape in Cyberspace,” which describes how an online community struggled to develop punitive norms against misbehavior in their world. Almost a quarter century later we still regularly come across actions, enabled by digital technology, that challenge our understanding of socially acceptable behavior.

The following examples are presented in order to gain a better understanding of cybervigilantism. They are chosen for the ways in which they exemplify disproportionate social (over)reactions to the mundane actions of a noncelebrity. Sometimes the actions being reacted to did not take place online, but the acts of vigilantism did.

**Korean Dog Poop Girl**

One of the early cases of internet outrage took place in South Korea in 2005. It involved a young woman traveling with her lapdog on the subway in Seoul. The dog pooped on the floor of the car, and despite the anger of her fellow travelers, the woman refused to clean up the mess.

The story was shared widely under the moniker gaettongnyeo (dog poop girl), the offender was quickly identified, and her name and other personal information appeared online. This led to large amounts of threats and condemnation from internet users both in Korea and across the globe (Anonymous 1, 2005; Anonymous 2, 2005; Editorial, 2005; Krim, 2005). The shamed woman dropped out of university (Solove, 2007) and wrote an online apology “I know I was wrong, but you guys are so harsh. I’m regret it, but I was so embarrassed so I just wanted to leave there. I was very irritable because many people looked at me and pushed me to clean the poop. Anyhow, I’m sorry. But, if you keep putting me down on the Internet I will sue all the people and at the worst I will commit suicide. So please don’t do that anymore. (sic)” (Dennis, 2008).

Commenting on the case, Daniel Solove (2007) argued that most would agree that not cleaning up after your dog is wrong, but that the internet
allows the punishment to be disproportionate to the violation: “But having a permanent record of one’s norm violations is upping the sanction to a whole new level...allowing bloggers to act as a cyber-posse, tracking down norm violators and branding them with digital scarlet letters.”

**The Infamous Tweet**

The Justine Sacco affair is arguably the textbook example of extreme outrage discussed in this chapter. In December 2013, Justine Sacco, while traveling to Cape Town, was entertaining herself with social media, tweeting comments and observations to her 170 followers (Ronson, 2015). Before boarding the flight she tweeted “Going to Africa. Hope I don’t get AIDS. Just kidding. I’m white!” The tweet is stark, and jokey; many perceived it as racist while others saw it as a comment on white guilt and the privilege of being safe when others are suffering (Bercovici, 2013).

During the hours she was in the air, the racist interpretation prevailed on twitter, especially when Sam Biddle, a journalist at Gawker with 15,000 followers, alerted the internet to this tweet. Reactions were swift. On twitter, people asked how she could work in a PR job, there was a predictable storm of abuse, her employer posted: “This is an outrageous, offensive comment. Employee in question currently unreachable on an intl flight,” and the hashtag #HasJustineLandedYet began to trend. Those following the storm delighted in the knowledge that she was oblivious to what was happening online: “We are about to watch this @JustineSacco bitch get fired. In REAL time. Before she even KNOWS she’s getting fired” (Ronson, 2015).

**The Auschwitz Selfie**

On June 20, 2014, a teenager visiting the Auschwitz concentration camp takes a smiling selfie, writes the text “Selfie in the Auschwitz Concentration Camp,” adds a smiley face, and posts the content on her Twitter account. Nothing really happened until one month later when the post started making the rounds on twitter with outraged comments pointing out the inappropriateness of smiling in a concentration camp. Predictably, she was mocked, criticized, and threatened with a range of violent acts.

The act of taking a selfie is often derided as being self-centered and narcissistic. Much of the discussions about the selfie have revolved around whether it should be understood as an act of narcissism, empowerment, or a new visual communication (Rettberg Walker, 2014; Wendt, 2014). The positions in the media are often polarizing and unforgiving, as when Ryan writes: “Selfies aren’t empowering; they’re a high tech reflection of the fucked up way society
teaches women that their most important quality is their physical attractiveness” (2013).

This discussion becomes quickly more heated when selfies are taken in “inappropriate” spaces or events, such as funerals or solemn memorial sites (Meese et al., 2015). However, no matter what personal position may be taken on the selfie, it is important to recognize that it is not only a teenage act, as evidenced when President Obama, British Prime Minister David Cameron, and Danish Prime Minister Helle Thorning-Schmidt took a group selfie at Nelson Mandela’s memorial service.

**The Hashtag Protest**

In 2014, in an attempt to pacify sentiments over the Washington Redskins name controversy, team owner Daniel Snyder launched the Washington Redskins Original Americans Foundation. According to the nonprofit’s website, the mission is “…to provide resources that offer genuine opportunities for Tribal communities.” In a comment on this move, The Colbert Report tweeted “I am willing to show #Asian community I care by introducing the Ching-Chong Ding-Dong Foundation for Sensitivity to Orientals or Whatever.”

Upon reading this, Suey Park took offence and tweeted “The Ching-Chong Ding-Dong Foundation for Sensitivity to Orientals has decided to call for #CancelColbert. Trend it.” This tweet was spread widely and she was asked to participate in a Huffington Post video to explain her position. Cybervigilantes were not pacified and Park was accused of racism. As outrage grew, Park was threatened with violence, violent rape, and death. Park was doxxed (had her personal information spread online) and she judged these threats as credible enough for her to change her appearance, leave Chicago for New York, and switch to burner phones. Even after Stephen Colbert asked his fans to leave Park alone, the threats kept coming (Bruenig, 2015; Watercutter, 2016; Wong, 2014).

**The Lion Hunter**

In 2015, an American dentist hunted, killed, decapitated, and skinned a 13-year-old black male lion named Cecil. His actions were far from unique or extraordinary and yet he quickly became the target of massive online outrage, online and offline abuse, and had to temporarily close his practice for fear of retribution (Cronin, 2015).

On Facebook, groups and pages were created with the express purpose of shaming the dentist. On the review site yelp.com, the dentist has one star out
of five and his reviews remain filled with a critique of his hunting rather than his skills as a dentist, insults and threats.

**It Is Digital, but Is It Vigilantism?**

While the acts above have been described as instances of online vigilantism or cybervigilantism by mass media, it is important to attempt to apply a more rigorous approach to the discussion. If we are to be satisfied with the traditional view that the vigilante is an individual or group taking the law into their own hands, then we may argue that all the above examples are vigilantism. The first step is to distinguish vigilantism, which may be illegal but arguably morally justifiable, from opportunism, bullying, or self-serving actions. This will be done by comparing cybervigilantism to Johnston’s (1996) six criteria mentioned earlier.

The first three criteria define vigilantism as planned reactions to norm violations in which actors participate voluntarily. The examples above generally fit these criteria.

The online vigilantes demonstrated some level of planning and forethought into their actions as they set up websites and social media accounts, and even started petitions. However, these examples of planning are also illustrations of a need to create wider support for the action. Once the action gets started, the widespread campaign does not require planning or deep conviction on the part of the group participating in the action. All the examples also demonstrate that the participants are taking part voluntarily and are generally investing their own time and equipment.

Additionally, all the participants are reacting to the transgression of a law or social norm. The expression of outrage involved in the dog poop incident, infamous tweet, Auschwitz selfie, and antiracism vigilantism are excellent examples of individuals coming together to express their outrage at the perceived violation of a social norm. In the dog poop incident, infamous tweet, Auschwitz selfie, and hashtag protest examples, the participants conducting the online shaming, outing, and judging were not required to do more than to comment from their preexisting social media accounts. This raises the question about the level of deeper conscientious thought about the participation and its consequences. This ease of participation is problematic as it brings into question the underlying motivations for participation. Just as the way in which some forms of online activism are criticized for being slacker activism (Klang & Madison, 2016), it is arguable that this is slacker vigilantism.

The fourth characteristic Johnston associates with vigilantism is the creation of a social movement. This is more controversial than the first three
criteria, as the term movement may be less applicable to these social media acts. A social movement is a collected, conscious, and continued effort by volunteers to bring about social change (Goodwin & Jasper, 2015), and while it is easy to see how several people tweeting their anger and even threats of violence may be collected under a topic or even a hashtag, it is less clear whether they should be seen as conscious or continued.

Beginning with the latter, the very ephemeral nature of social media almost negates the idea of continued effort. The infinite flow of ideas and information on social media does little to support sustained and continued campaigns, so cybervigilantism does not meet the criterion of a continued effort. But should this lack of continued effort really serve as a disqualifying factor when assessing whether or not a collective action amounts to a social movement? The internet in general and social media in particular are redefining many of our social interactions, and this is also true of our concept of social movement.

The speed at which social media enable people to organize around a cause can make it seem spontaneous and unorganized. However, when groups of people are following a hashtag or gathering (virtually or otherwise) around a cause they are forming a collected, conscious, and continued effort. What constitutes continued effort in the online world is different from offline spaces, but this work rejects the criticism that these groups are too temporary to be designated movements. Whether online naming and shaming campaign constitutes a social movement depends on commitment and consciousness of the participants, not on duration.

But to what extent are the examples mentioned above really conscious and indicative of a high level of commitment? The threats of (sexual) violence and death spread via social media aimed at the dog poop girl, Auschwitz selfie, and infamous tweet are conscious in the sense that they were not committed unconsciously. Despite this, it is fair to question (1) the level of thought that precluded the critique, derogatory remark, or threat, and (2) the actual intent of the vigilante. Technology makes it easy to like or share without much effort and there is evidence indicating that many users don’t take the time to read the information they are sharing on social media (Jeffries, 2014).

Criterion number five is the (threat of) use of force. If we allow the definition of force to include the emotional or social pain caused by social ostracism, threats of violence, and loss of income through termination, then it is easy to see how online vigilantism easily fulfills this criterion. But are these outcomes really intentional? The cybervigilante’s hateful or harmful remarks may cause pain, but what level of pain was intended? And if there is a desire to cause pain, what is the reason behind it? Is the person acting to uphold some form
of social norm he or she believes has been transgressed (i.e., vigilantism), or is there a desire to cause harm to a person whose actions he or she dislikes (i.e., bullying), or is there a level of pleasure in harassing a person online (i.e., trolling)? While bullying and trolling might motivate some participants, it is clear that many others want to threaten the perceived transgressors or intentionally cause them harm in reaction to a violated norm.

Finally, vigilantism purports to offer security by acting as a policing and punishing factor to alleged transgressors. It may be argued that those doxxing dog poop girl are acting to ensure that transgressors of rules and social norms cannot do so without fearing punishment. However, could the same argument be made of the infamous tweet, the hashtag protest, and the Auschwitz selfie? In each of these cases, no law was broken but the conflict is over a social norm that the vigilante believes has been violated. The policing and punishing therefore is taking place over social norms that are not shared by the stakeholders.

This analysis shows that the online actions explored here largely fall within the scope of vigilantism as defined by Johnston’s six criteria. However, the use of technology to mediate the action does affect the ways in which online vigilantism is carried out. Most of the changes are minor and insubstantial, but as mentioned earlier, the ease of participation in the online social movement forces us to question to what extent these actions and their consequences are intentional. This is particularly interesting as the question of intent in the offline world was easier to discern because of the obvious investments in time and energy required. As the question of intent is vital to the discussion it will be explored further below.

**Intent and Knowledge: Vigilantism, Outrage, or Outrage Porn?**

The use of the term *vigilante* grants a level of legitimacy onto the perpetrator. The vigilante does take the law into his or her own hands and in doing so generally breaks the law, but is not seen as a simple criminal. The vigilante is breaking the law but does so for the greater good. If Robin Hood had stolen from the evil rich and kept the rewards solely for himself, he would not have been a vigilante but a criminal. What we see is that vigilantism requires a level of altruism, in the sense that the vigilante is not acting out of a desire for personal gains. This intent and de facto result may become more complex when dealing with the cybervigilante.

The rapid flows of online information, and the ease at which groups or networks can form and disband are one of its defining qualities. To participate together with a group of people in a Facebook group or following a
Twitter hashtag requires next to no effort. In the context of online activism, critiques of this low-level investment have spawned the discussion on slacktivism (Klang & Madison, 2016) where some argue that true activism requires a greater investment than participating in social media (Morozov, 2009).

An analogy could be drawn with cybervigilantism, where one would argue it is not vigilantism at all, but some form of slacktivism where the participants have a low level of physical investment in reacting to an easily forgettable transgression. However, the resulting storm of users through their sheer numbers and language use make it seem like the online vigilante group is cohesive, coordinated, and legitimately angry.

This legitimate anger is not the defining factor of vigilantism, but it is the essence of outrage. Indeed, the difference between anger at being personally wronged is different from the anger aroused by experiencing others’ being wronged. “Anger at unfair treatment has been called moral outrage. However, moral outrage—anger at the violation of a moral standard—should be distinguished from personal anger at being harmed and empathic anger at seeing another for whom one cares harmed” (Batson et al., 2007, p. 1272).

Outrage does not require the taking of the law into one’s own hands, but if moral outrage is anger provoked by an unfair situation or the violation of a moral standard or principle (Batson et al., 2007), then vigilantism could be a resulting reaction.

An alternate interpretation is that the online actions are less coordinated, less social movement (which are some of the criteria to qualify as vigilantism) and more a collective of outrage. This moral outrage is still directed at transgressors of social norms or legal rules but lacks the legitimacy of coordination and some of the altruism involved in vigilantism. Outrage is less for the greater good than for serving the need for self-expression in the face of inequality.

This then becomes even more troubling when we look at the ways in which the outraged treat the target of their attack. The targets, who are the transgressors of a real or perceived social norm (such as Auschwitz selfie), are seen as fair game and no taunt, insult, or threat is too far. In this, the outraged group moves as a mob spurring each other on. The outraged are more concerned with their intentions than the effects of their actions. It was more important to express outrage against dog poop girl than to consider the impact of the communication.

In this outrage we can see that anonymity as a cause for action is not as important as previously envisioned. The outraged are not people doing bad things from the cover of vague user names. Many are openly using their normal accounts to harass and communicate—in some instances—prosecutable threats. It would seem that they do not feel the need for anonymity, as
they are part of a larger group collectively acting in a similar fashion. The group creates a false consensus that enables its members to overestimate how common their words, ideas, and opinions are. Therefore, the power they feel within the outrage group trumps their need to mask their identities.

Both Dougherty (2014) and Holiday (2014) argue that the outrage is not quite as natural as we would believe. In the case of the Auschwitz selfie, a month passed before any reactions occurred, and in the infamous tweet example, Sacco barely had enough followers to carry out sustained outrage. Indeed in many of the vigilante/outrage cases online there is evidence that the outrage is curated by a third party, someone is creating the trigger for the larger online group to become outraged.

This then is more than outrage, it is outrage porn; the participants have a platform, are given a target, and find a release for their moral outrage. Dougherty (2014) writes that the participation in the outrage “…makes him feel like an actor in a great moral struggle, either as victim or as triumphant voice of justice.” It is easy to see that in an attention economy (Davenport & Beck, 2001) where clicks are rewarded (Blom & Hansen, 2015), the cultivation of social outrage plays an integral part of the ways in which online writing is shaping journalism.

When the outrage is cultivated and curated, the target of the resulting abuse is chosen for effect rather than the actual transgression of a social norm. Take, for example, the shooting of Cecil the Lion, where the hunter was massively criticized online and offline, was subjected to abuse and even vandalism (Capecchi & Rogers, 2015). The anger at this hunter should be put into perspective of the information that “…every year foreign hunters export the carcasses (usually just the head and hide) of 665 wild lions from Africa—an average of nearly two lions each day” (Cronin, 2015). Not to mention the wide range of other big cats and endangered species killed daily without the popular outrage generated for Cecil.

This selective outrage, when not selected by the outraged, based on incomplete or factually incorrect information skews the notion of vigilantism and turns it into a tool for the instigator of the outrage rather than the good of the community.

**Conclusion**

The goal of this chapter has been to study acts of social (over)reactions to the mundane actions of a noncelebrity in order to develop an understanding of the concept of cybervigilantism. It began with a brief foray into the literature on vigilantism and then took those criteria and looked at them in the light of
our digital infrastructure. The findings in this work show that technology has far increased the reach of everyday actors to participate in shaming of individuals online. This is most certainly one factor to account for the instances of online shaming and also an important element in the need to revisit the concept of vigilantism in the online environment. Through technological mediation the cybervigilante needs few special skills and faces next to no physical or emotional challenges in their acts of vigilantism. The latter is important as it brings into question the moral legitimation of the act.

Additionally, the haphazard choice of the victims of cybervigilantism and the mob-like nature of the cybervigilantes make it difficult or impossible for the victims to understand why they are being targeted. Therefore, this chapter finds that the claims to legitimacy are vague at best and as the phenomenon does not seem to be disappearing it should be the focus of further legal and ethical study.

References


