End of Anonymous Drinking

Once again the United Kingdom is pushing itself into the forefront of the implementation of surveillance technology.

In an attempt to curb alcohol related violence and under-age drinking pubs are now increasing the use of an experimental system that involves taking fingerprints identification data from pub patrons. Once the patrons have been identified all they need to do is to scan their fingerprints at the door to be admitted.

The scheme has been applauded for simplifying the hassle of identity cards and the database will also make it possible for pubs to ban violent patrons for limited time periods.

Schemes such as this are usually launched on the idea of security and fears are downplayed by the use of the word voluntary. The problem being that schemes such as this are invasive as they are (even worse if they are abused). Additionally the idea of voluntary as a protection of integrity is not enough.

Once voluntary systems are implemented it usually does not take long before those in charge begin to view those who have not volunteered as first being annoying since they disrupt the system and then suspicious since they â??obviouslyâ?? have something to hide.

More
BBC.co.uk

The Register

Wiltshire.co.uk

(via Slashdot)

PhD Defence Preview

So it’s all happening tomorrow. I defend my thesis. Not only will I be the placed under scrutiny and stress – but I will also be wearing a suit! For those of you who may want to read the thesis it’s over here.

If you don’t feel like reading it you can get the main arguments & counter-arguments by attending the defence tomorrow in Göteborg (again more info here).

If you cannot attend then you can catch me presenting my thesis at Humlab in Umeå. The presentation has been streamed and is online here.

Here are some “promotional” pictures…

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Anti-RFID designs

RFID chips have been around for some time without really taking off. The main discussions have been in specialised privacy or technology discussions. This changed when the plans were launched to add RFID to passports. These plans have raised many concerns from privacy activists. These concerns have only increased now that the planned passports have been demonstrated as not being particularly secure. They have already been both hacked and cloned.

For the security aware: companies are now beginning to offer wallets, or a DIY version made from duct tape. Or why not special designs for clothes. All of which prevent RFID products from being read. The fundamental principal is to create a Faraday Cage effect around the RFID antenna to block the readers.

This is the same principle (as used by the stereotypical crazy-man) of wearing a tin-foil hat to prevent aliens/government from scanning the brain… here is a research article showing the inefficiency of the tin-foil hat.

Background material:

Ari Juels “RFID Security and Privacy: A Research Survey” Research Report, RSA Laboratories, September 2005.

Matt Ward & Rob van Kranenburg “RFID: Frequency, standards, adoption and innovation” JISC Technology and Standards Watch, May 2006.

Ann Cavoukian “Tag, Youâ??re It: Privacy Implications of RadioFrequency Identification (RFID)Technology” Information and Privacy Commissioner Ontario, February 2004.

Fingerprinting Children

Mandatory fingerprinting for all over children over 12. Does this sound like an idea straight out of a dystopian nightmare? Wrong! This comes from a report (EU doc no: 9403/1/06) from the EU Council Presidency meeting of 26 June 2006. And it gets worse individual states will be fingerprinting infants from day one â?? as soon as this becomes technically possible.

Why the age of six? Is it to protect the integrity of the youngest? No such luck. As the report states: â??Scientific tests have confirmed that the papillary ridges on the fingers are not sufficiently developed to allow biometric capture and analysis until the age of six.â??

This issue was previously discussed in the meeting of the Visa Working Party (EU doc no: 10540/06). This latter discussion shows an unanimous will to adopt compulsory fingerprinting and no real integrity objections to states to adopt fingerprinting at an earlier age.

In May the BBC reported that children under the age of five were being fingerprinted to attempt to ensure that fraudulent benefit claims made by asylum seekers were unsuccessful.

(via Statewatch)

DNA databases & privacy

Three 12-year olds were arrested in the UK for breaking some branches while climbing a cherry tree. The three children were climbing a cherry tree when the police came and carted them off to the police station. The children had their pictures taken for mug-shots, DNA samples were taken and finally they had their shoes removed before being made to wait in police cells for two hours before being released.

Naturally I believe that trees deserve protection but this is ridiculous. The children now have criminal records which will be stored for five years. Also the DNA samples will not be destroyed after the five years (unless the UK has special rules for minors & DNA).

The word proportionality is very popular right now – it should be applied more often…

(via Daily Mail)

RIP Act & Encryption

The UK Government has launched a public consultation on Part I and III of The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA). Part III of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA), allowing the police to ask for the disclosure of encryption keys or force suspects to decrypt encrypted data has not yet been implemented but the government considers time has come for it. The arguments relate to the rapid development of encryption products and the increased availability to such products including integrated security features in operating systems.
Comments on the two draft codes are expected by 30 August.
(via EDRI)

Does Bodström dream of high-tech hammers?

The Swedish Minister of Justice Thomas Bodström can without a doubt be placed among the European Ministerâ??s most hostile to civil liberties (older posts about this here & here & here). Besides blogging about it (along with many others) Henrik Sandklef and I wrote a debate article concerning this mans naïve faith in technological solutions to crime. It was published in the newspaper (in Swedish) and the Minister replied â?? well sort ofâ?¦he never actually met our arguments on civil rights violations, but claimed that the police needed tools to do their job (in Swedish).

Yesterday the Chairman of the Swedish Police Union, Björn Ericson, wrote in a debate article (in Swedish) that despite the Ministerâ??s claims that the police force has increased by 1500 policemen the actual numbers show that the number of policemen have decreased by almost 700 since 1997. Ericson wonders whether the 1500 policemen are all working deep undercover since nobody besides the Minister seems to know where they are.

Besides the politics (it is, after all, an election year), Ericson brings up a vital point in his article. Who will watch the tapes, analyse the data and read the log files? Much of the current wisdom concerning police enforcement deals with the importance of visibility. Policemen on the streets. It is not only important that the police patrol but also that they be seen to be patrolling.

Technology costs. The cost of building and maintaining a high-tech police force will create higher costs for the police. This will mean that they will have to make budget choices. Either be visible or spend money on technology. Our Minister has shown his inclination lies in the dream of a technological future â?? but what is missing in this dream?

Implementing the high-tech surveillance society will entail making choices. Simple choices with far reaching effects. The Bodström vision entails moving the police from all types of prevention and focus them on the cure. In the long run prevention is more cost efficient than cure. All the high-tech in the world cannot, will not, prevent crime. The only aspect of use is that high-tech may provide proof in the ensuing court case. And this can only be achieved through the trampling of civil liberties and therefore must only be used as little as possible.

The choices the police are being forced to make will therefore change their purpose. They will not be about the prevention of crime but rather the police will become the servants of the courts, the errand boys of the prosecutor. Despite their handcuffs, handguns and truncheons their primary work will be the collection of data for analysis. This is not unworthy work but it does not prevent the bulk of most crimes.

Technology such as that of bugging (phones and computers), DNA databases and surveillance cameras are all tools. Tools work well to resolve certain problems. With the right tools people became efficient â?? a large part of human development can be studied in the development of certain tools (fire, bronze axes, steam engines, silicon chipsâ?¦) but with the wrong tools the work becomes difficult, if not impossible. Of course you can bang in a nail with a screwdriver â?? but at a cost.

Most violent crimes (Terrorism, Saturday-night brawling, violence and abuse at home) will not be prevented by buying technology. The 9/11 terrorists used their own names â?? it would not have mattered to them if they had been asked to donate DNA. Putting more, and better trained, police on the streets â?? does have an effect on crime.

More patrolling policemen would not have prevented 9/11 â?? there is no way to prevent the determined. More patrolling police will not prevent abuse in homes. This takes an even more costly prevention â?? education and social welfare. But it is a better preventative cure for most other crimes. In addition to this it does not violate the civil rights of law-abiding people in the hope of catching the criminal.

There is a saying: When the only tool you have is a hammer, every problem looks like a nail. Thomas Bodström is busying buying the dream of the big high-tech hammer and no matter how many different problems people attempt to explain to him with this approach all he can see is nails â?? and he cannot wait to pound us down.

"We see you" protest today

Sweden has been erratic in moving into the surveillance society. While the bureaucratic tools such as personal identity numbers and identity cards have been used (and abused) for a long time the icon of the surveillance age â?? the camera has not.

This may be due to the Swedish trust in government. State surveillance and control is in place to make society efficient for all therefore it is to be tolerated. Private surveillance is however suspicious â?? or at least it has been.

Legal changes in camera surveillance rules in 1998 began a trend of privatised surveillance which is today causing the massive use of surveillance cameras. Amongst the more unusual uses â?? which are novel in Sweden â?? are camera surveillance of schools and workplaces.

So with the late development of the surveillance state, Swedes are also slowly developing a reaction to it. Today an organisation called Vi Ser Dig (We See You) based at the University of Linköping will stand in a central square in Stockholm take pictures of passers by in an attempt to awaken interest in the almost dead surveillance debate.

Sergels Torg – picture from D. Kolb’s cool site Sprawling Places

So if you are anywhere near Sergels Torg (between 2pm-7pm) â?? bring a camera and become part of the protest.

VISERDIG.SE Uppmanar Allmänheten/Medier/Politiker att Närvara vid Manifestationen den 27/4 kl 14-19 med Syfte att Personifiera �vervakningen!

Mobile phone privacy

Gordon Gowâ??s report on Privacy in relation to prepaid mobile phones is out now. The report Privacy Rights and Prepaid Communication Services. A survey of prepaid mobile phone regulation and registration policies among OECD member states (download pdf here) makes interesting reading on the right to privacy.

The report comes at a time when terrorism is being used as a motivation for governments to limit or prohibit anonymous mobile telephones through prepaids.

Fifteen of the 24 countries that responded to the survey do not have an identity requirement; however, at least six countries considered and rejected a prepaid registration policy following a consultation process. These countries are Canada, Czech Republic, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands and Poland. The UK respondent indicated that the UK government might have informally considered and rejected registration.

The project website.